Predicativity beyond Gamma_0 by Weaver, Nik
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
05
09
24
4v
3 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
09
PREDICATIVITY BEYOND Γ0
NIK WEAVER
Abstract. We reevaluate the claim that predicative reasoning (given the nat-
ural numbers) is limited by the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal Γ0. First we com-
prehensively criticize the arguments that have been offered in support of this
position. Then we analyze predicativism from first principles and develop a
general method for accessing ordinals which is predicatively valid according to
this analysis. We find that the Veblen ordinal φΩω (0), and larger ordinals, are
predicatively provable.
The precise delineation of the extent of predicative reasoning is possibly one of
the most remarkable modern results in the foundations of mathematics. Building on
ideas of Kreisel [27, 28], Feferman [10] and Schu¨tte [40, 41] independently identified
a countable ordinal Γ0 and argued that it is the smallest predicatively non-provable
ordinal. (Throughout, I take “predicative” to mean “predicative given the natural
numbers”.) This conclusion has become the received view in the foundations com-
munity, with reference [10] in particular having been cited with approval in virtually
every discussion of predicativism for the past forty years. Γ0 is now commonly re-
ferred to as “the ordinal of predicativity”. Some recent publications which explicitly
make this assertion are [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 36, 37, 39, 44, 45].
This achievement is notable both for its technical sophistication and for the
insight it provides into an important foundational stance. Although predicativism
is out of favor now, at one time it was advocated by such luminaries as Poincare´,
Russell, and Weyl. (Historical overviews are given in [18] and [35].) Its central
principle — that sets have to be “built up from below” — is, on its face, reasonable
and attractive. With its rejection of a metaphysical set concept, predicativism
also provides a cogent resolution of the set-theoretic paradoxes and is more in line
with the positivistic aspect of modern analytic philosophy than are the essentially
platonic views which have become mathematically dominant.
Undoubtedly one of the main reasons predicativism was not accepted by the
general mathematical public early on was its apparent failure to support large
portions of mainstream mathematics. However, we now know that the bulk of
core mathematics can in fact be developed in predicative systems [15, 43], and the
limitation identified by Feferman and Schu¨tte is probably now a primary reason,
possibly the primary reason, for predicativism’s nearly universal unpopularity.1
There do exist important mainstream theorems which are known to in various
senses require provability of Γ0, and in any case Γ0 is sufficiently tame that it
is simply hard to take seriously any approach to foundations that prevents one
from recognizing ordinals at least this large. Thus, it is of great foundational
interest to examine carefully whether the Γ0 limitation really is correct. If it is
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not, predicativism could be more viable than previously thought and its current
peripheral status in the philosophy of mathematics may need to be reconsidered.
I believe Γ0 has nothing to do with predicativism. I will argue that the current
understanding of predicativism is fundamentally flawed and that a more careful
analysis shows the “small” Veblen ordinal φΩω (0), and probably much larger ordi-
nals, to be within the scope of predicative mathematics. It is my hope that this
conclusion will open the way to a serious reappraisal of the significance and interest
of predicativism. Elsewhere I introduce the term “mathematical conceptualism”
for the brand of predicativism considered here and make a case that it is cogent,
rigorous, attractive, and better suited to ordinary mathematical practice than all
other foundational stances [46].
1. A critique of the Γ0 thesis
At issue is the assertion that there are well-ordered sets of all order types less
than Γ0 and of no order types greater than or equal to Γ0 which can be proven to
be well-ordered using predicative methods (cf. [10], p. 13 or [42], p. 220). I call this
the Γ0 thesis.
As stated, this claim is imprecise because the classical concept of well-ordering
has a variety of formulations which are not predicatively equivalent (see §1.4 and
§2.4). In fact, previous discussions of predicativism have tended to ignore this
distinction, and this will emerge as a crucial source of confusion (see §1.4). To fix
ideas I will use the term “well-ordered” to mean of a set X that it is totally ordered
and if Y ⊆ X is progressive then Y = X . Progressive means that for every a ∈ X ,
if {b ∈ X : b ≺ a} ⊆ Y then a ∈ Y .
In principle, to falsify the Γ0 thesis I need only produce (1) a well-ordering
proof of an ordered set that is isomorphic to Γ0 and (2) a convincing case that
the proof is predicatively valid. However, no matter how convincing I could make
that case, in light of the broad and sustained acceptance the thesis has enjoyed it
would be unsatisfying to leave the matter there. The Γ0 thesis has been repeatedly
and forcefully defended by two major figures, Feferman and Kreisel. Many current
authors simply assert it as a known fact. The only substantial published criticism
of which I am aware appears in [24], but even that is somewhat ambivalent and
seems to conclude in favor of the thesis. Therefore, I take it that I have a burden
not only to positively demonstrate the power of predicative reasoning, but also to
show where the more pessimistic previous assessments went wrong.
This is a somewhat lengthy task because a great deal has been written in support
of the Γ0 thesis from a variety of points of view. However, I believe that the entire
body of argument is specious and can be decisively refuted. The goal of Section 1
is to do this in some detail.
One point before I begin. Predicativism is a philosophical position, and prior to
the acceptance of a particular formalization there will be room for argument over
its precise nature. Thus, a debate about the Γ0 thesis could easily degenerate into
a purely semantic dispute over the meaning of the term “predicative”. I therefore
want to emphasize that the central claim of this section is that there is no coherent
philosophical stance which would lead one to accept every ordinal less than Γ0 but
not Γ0 itself. My polemical technique will be to examine various formal systems that
have been alleged to model predicative reasoning and indicate how in each instance
the informal principles that motivate the system actually justify a stronger system
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which goes beyond Γ0. This is obviously independent of any special views one may
have about predicativity. (A second major claim is that none of these supposedly
predicative systems is actually predicatively legitimate. Evaluating the justice of
this claim does require some understanding of predicativism, and I refer the reader
who is not prepared to accept any assertion of this type at face value to Section 2,
where I develop my views on predicativism in detail.)
1.1. Formal systems for predicativity. A variety of formal systems have been
proposed as modelling predicative reasoning in some form of second order arith-
metic. Among the main examples are Σ [27], H+, R+, H , R [10], RA∗ [42], P+∃/P
[13], Ref∗(PA(P )) [14], and U(NFA) [19]. I give here a brief sketch of their most
important features.
The systems Σ, H , and R are similar in broad outline and need not be dis-
tinguished in this discussion; likewise for the systems H+, R+, and RA∗. All six
express a concept of “autonomy” which allows one to access larger ordinal notations
from smaller ones and I will refer to them generally as “autonomous systems”. In
the last three systems the idea is that once a predicativist has proven the well-
foundedness of a set of order type α he is allowed to use infinite proof trees of
height α to establish the well-foundedness of larger order types, the key infinitary
feature being an “ω-rule” which permits deduction of the formula (∀n)A(n), where
n is a number variable, from the family of formulas A(n) with n ranging over all
numerals. In the first three systems all proofs are finite and the key proof principle
is a “formalized ω-rule” schema which, for each formula A, concludes the formula
(∀n)A(n) from a premise which arithmetically expresses that for every number n
there is a proof of A(n). This leads to a hierarchy of systems Sa where a is an ordi-
nal notation and Sa⊕1 incorporates a formalized ω-rule schema referring to proofs
in Sa. The predicativist is then permitted to execute a finite succession of proofs in
various Sa’s, subject to the requirement that passage to any Sa must be preceded
by a proof that a is an ordinal notation.
The linked systems P and ∃/P are notable for their conception of predicativists
as having a highly restricted yet not completely trivial ability to deal with second
order quantification, in particular their being able to use only free or, to a limited
extent, existentially quantified set variables. Second order existential quantification
is actually permitted only in the “auxiliary” system ∃/P , but once a functional has
been shown to exist uniquely one is allowed to introduce a symbol for it which can
then be used in P . By passing back and forth between P and ∃/P one is able to
produce functionals which provably enumerate larger and larger initial segments of
the ramified hierarchy over an arbitrary set and use them to prove the well-ordering
property for successively larger ordinal notations.
The system Ref∗(PA(P )) is obtained by applying a general construction Ref∗ to a
“schematic” form PA(P ) of Peano arithmetic. This construction involves extending
the language of PA(P ) to allow assertions of truth and falsehood and adding axioms
which govern the use of the truth and falsehood predicates. Paradoxes arising from
a self-referential notion of truth are avoided by regarding the truth and falsehood
predicates as partial and axiomatizing them in a way that expresses their ultimate
groundedness in facts about PA(P ). The ability to reason about truth in effect
implements the formalized ω-rule mentioned above, and this again enables one to
prove the well-foundedness of successively larger ordinal notations. The general idea
is that Ref∗(S(P )) embodies what one “ought to accept” given that one accepts
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a schematic theory S(P ), and an argument can then be made that predicativism
is fundamentally based on Peano arithmetic and therefore Ref∗(PA(P )) precisely
captures what a predicativist ought to accept.
Like Ref∗(PA(P )), U(NFA) is an instance of a general construction which ap-
plies to any schematic formal system and is supposed to embody what one ought
to accept once one accepts that system. However, the exact claim is slightly dif-
ferent: here we are concerned with determining “which operations and predicates,
and which principles concerning them, ought to be accepted” once one has ac-
cepted the initial system ([19], p. 75). This problem is approached from the point
of view of generalized recursion theory and one is allowed to generate operations
and predicates by using a least fixed point operator. It is easily seen that this recur-
sive generation procedure rapidly recovers Peano arithmetic from a weaker theory
NFA (“non-finitist arithmetic”); therefore, U(NFA) is already supposed to capture
predicative reasoning.
1.2. Outline of the critique. All of the proposed formalizations of predicative
reasoning cited in §1.1 have the same provable ordinals, namely all ordinals less
than Γ0. This by itself might be seen as good evidence in favor of the Γ0 thesis
simply because it seems unlikely that so many different approaches should all have
settled on the same wrong answer.
Nonetheless, each of the formal systems in §1.1 is simultaneously too weak and
too strong to faithfully model predicative reasoning and thereby verify the claim
about Γ0. They are all too weak for a general reason I discuss in §1.3; in brief,
anyone who accepts a given system ought to be able to grasp its global validity and
then go beyond it. This is an old objection and there are several responses to it on
record. However, these responses, which I review below, are not well-taken because
they typically involve postulating (usually with little or no overt justification) a
limitation on predicative reasoning which, if true, would actually have prevented a
predicativist from working within the original system.
In addition, each system is manifestly impredicative in some way, and hence
too strong. This fact does not seem to be widely appreciated, but it is hardly
obscure. The autonomous systems impredicatively infer a transfinite iteration of
reflection principles from a statement of transfinite induction. P + ∃/P allows
predicate substitution for Σ11 formulas, so that for every Σ
1
1 formula A it in effect
lets one reason about {n : A(n)} as if this were a meaningful set, which in general
is predicatively not the case. Ref∗(PA(P )) makes truth claims about schematic
predicates which do not make sense unless one assumes an impredicative compre-
hension axiom. U(NFA) employs a patently impredicative least fixed point operator
and also treats schematic predicates in a way that again can only be justified by
impredicative comprehension. I will elaborate on all of these points below.
The most striking impredicativity is the least fixed point operator of U(NFA),
but the other instances are actually more significant because they fit into a general
pattern. The basic problem is that in each of these systems one proves the well-
foundedness of successively larger ordinal notations by an inductive argument that
at each step involves generating some kind of iterative hierarchy which is used
to prove transfinite induction at the next level — but this does not justify the
statement of transfinite recursion which is needed to generate the next hierarchy.
In order to make this inference from induction to recursion one has to smuggle an
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impredicative step somewhere into the proof, and this is the function of all the
other examples of impredicativity noted above. I will return to this point in §1.9.
There are also more subtle instances of impredicativity which occur in the use of
self-applicative schematic predicates in Ref∗(PA(P )) and U(NFA) and in the use of
self-applicative truth and falsehood predicates in Ref∗(PA(P )); see §2.5 and §2.6.
I next describe an objection that is generally applicable, and then go on to discuss
the individual formal systems.
1.3. A general difficulty. Suppose A is a rational actor who has adopted some
foundational stance. Any attempt to precisely characterize the limits of A’s rea-
soning must meet the following objection: if we could show that A would accept
every member of some set of statements S, then A should see this too and then be
able to go beyond S, e.g. by asserting its consistency. Thus, S could not have been
a complete collection of all the statements (in a given language) that A would ac-
cept. A similar argument can be made about attempts to characterize A’s provable
ordinals.
There are a variety of ways in which this objection might be overcome. A may
actually be unable to recognize S as a legitimate set, for instance if S is infinite
and A is a finitist. Or the language in use may not be capable of expressing the
consistency of S. Or perhaps A can indeed see, as we do, that there exists a
proof that he would accept for each statement in S, but he cannot go from this to
actually accepting every statement in S (though it is difficult to imagine a plausible
set of beliefs that would not allow him to take this step). Or it may be possible
to identify some special limitation in A’s belief system which prevents him from
grasping the validity of all of S at once despite his ability to accept each statement
in S individually.2
Defenses of the Γ0 thesis generally take the last approach. This is tricky for
a slightly subtle reason. It is not hard to believe that A (or anyone) is unable
to simultaneously identify exactly which statements are true from his perspective.
But it is more difficult to reconcile this with the claim that we do know that he
would accept each statement in S. The most obvious way to establish this claim
would be to explicitly show how A would prove each statement in S, and this is
actually the method used in the case at hand: each of the proposed formal systems
for predicativism is accompanied by a recursive proof schema which is supposed to
show how a predicativist could use the system to access every ordinal less than Γ0.
What is confusing here is the suggestion that we can see that he would accept each
proof in the schema but he cannot see this.
In fact this is highly implausible, for the following reason. Let γ0 = 1 and
γn+1 = φγn(0), where {φα(β)} is the Veblen hierarchy of critical functions, so that
Γ0 = supn∈ω γn. Now in general we are not merely given a recursive set of proofs
which establish for each n that some notation an for γn is an ordinal notation; for
each of the formal systems under discussion, at least at an intuitive level we have
a single proof that for any n, an is an ordinal notation implies an+1 is an ordinal
notation. It therefore becomes hard to believe that someone who is presumed to
grasp induction on ω (and even, allegedly, in “schematic” form [14, 16, 19]) would
not be able to infer the single assertion that an is an ordinal notation for all n.
It is reasonable to expect that if a predicativist understands how to go from an
to an+1 for any single value of n, and if the passage from an to an+1 is essentially
the same for all n, then he can infer the statement that every an is an ordinal
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notation. As this would enable him to immediately deduce the well-foundedness of
an ordered set isomorphic to Γ0, advocates of the Γ0 thesis have a crucial burden
to explain why he cannot in fact do this. Yet the handful of attempts to establish
this point that appear in the literature are brief, vague, and, I will argue, simply
unpersuasive.
I now turn to the systems introduced in §1.1.
1.4. The finitary autonomous systems. The initial idea behind the finitary
autonomous systems Σ, H , andR is that if a predicativist trusts some formal system
for second order arithmetic, say ACA0 (see [43]), then he should accept not only the
theorems of the system itself, but also additional statements such as Con(ACA0)
which reflect the fact that the axioms are true. Feferman [9] analyzed several such
“reflection principles” and found the strongest of them to be the formalized ω-rule
schema
(∀n) [Prov(pA(n)q)→ A(n)] ,
where pA(n)q is the Go¨del number of A(n) and Prov formalizes “is the Go¨del
number of a provable formula” (here, provable in ACA0).
Having accepted this schema, the argument runs, the predicativist is then com-
mitted to a stronger system consisting of ACA0 plus the ω-rule schema, and he
should therefore now accept a version of the formalized ω-rule schema which refers
to provability in this stronger system. This process can be transfinitely iterated,
yielding a family of formal systems Sa indexed by Church-Kleene ordinal notations
a. Kreisel’s idea [27] was that a predicativist should accept the system indexed by
a when and only when he has a prior proof that a is an ordinal notation.3
Feferman [10] proved that when this procedure is carried out starting with a
reasonable base system S0, Γ0 is the smallest ordinal with the property that there
is no finite sequence of ordinal notations a1, . . . , an with a1 a notation for 0, an a
notation for Γ0, and such that Sai proves that ai+1 is an ordinal notation (1 ≤ i <
n). Thus, Γ0 is the smallest predicatively non-provable ordinal.
There are two fundamental problems with this analysis. The first is that the
plausibility of inferring soundness of Sa from the fact that a is an ordinal notation
hinges on our conflating two versions of the concept “ordinal notation” — supports
transfinite induction for arbitrary sets versus supports transfinite induction for
arbitrary properties — which are not predicatively equivalent. What we actually
prove about a is that, for a given partial order ≺ on a subset of ω, if X is a set
with the property that
(∀b) [(∀c ≺ b)(c ∈ X)→ b ∈ X ]
then every b ≺ a must belong to X . Classically this entails that for every formula
A the statement
(∀b) [(∀c ≺ b)A(c)→ A(b)]
implies A(b) for all b ≺ a because we can use a comprehension axiom and reason
about the set X = {b : A(b)}. Predicatively this should still be possible if, for
example, A is arithmetical, but not in general. Now the statement P(b) ≡ “if
ProvSb(pAq) then A, for every formula A” is not only not arithmetical, it cannot
even be formalized in the language of second order arithmetic. So we should not
expect there to be any obvious way to predicatively infer P(a) from what we have
proven about a. Indeed, there are good reasons to suppose that this inference is
not legitimate, for instance the fact that Sa proves the existence of arithmetical
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jump hierarchies up to a, which is formally stronger than the fact that transfinite
induction holds up to a for sets.
One may be tempted to dismiss this first objection as technical and to grant
that predicativists can make the disputed inference, but that leads to a second
basic problem: if a predicativist could somehow infer the soundness of Sa then he
actually ought to be able to infer more. This point was made well by Howard [24].
I would put it this way: according to Kreisel, a predicativist is (somehow) always
able to make the deduction
from I(a) and ProvSa(pA(n)q), infer A(n), (∗)
where I(a) formalizes the assertion that a is an ordinal notation. Shouldn’t he then
accept the assertion
(∀a)(∀n) [I(a) ∧ ProvSa(pA(n)q)→ A(n)] (∗∗)
for any formula A?
As a straightforward consequence of [10], one can use (∗∗) to prove I(a) with a
some standard notation for Γ0.
4 The claim must therefore be that a predicativist
can recognize each instance of (∗) to be valid but cannot recognize the validity of
the general assertion (∗∗). In other words, whenever he has proven that a is an
ordinal notation he can infer the statement that all theorems of Sa hold, but he
does not accept the statement “if a is an ordinal notation then all theorems of Sa
hold.” Why not?
(a) Kreisel’s first answer. Kreisel addresses this point in [27]. He writes:
Here, too, though each extension is predicative provided < has
been recognized by predicative means to be a well-ordering, the
general extension principle is not since [it is framed in terms of]
the concept of predicative proof [which] has no place in predicative
mathematics. ([27], p. 297; see also p. 290)
Although this comment sounds authoritative, it does not hold up under scrutiny
because in whatever sense it could be said that (∗∗) presumes the concept of pred-
icative proof, the same is true of any instance of (∗). If we had no concept of proof
or validity then we ought not be able to make the inference (∗) in any instance.
One can try to read something more subtle into Kreisel’s comment, but I have
not found any way to elaborate it into a convincing argument. Perhaps the best
attempt appears in §1.4 (b) below.
Similar reasoning would actually support a more severe conclusion. Consider:
Although the inference of B from A is predicative provided A has
been recognized by predicative means to imply B, the general prin-
ciple of modus ponens is not since it is framed in terms of the
concept of predicative truth, which has no place in predicative
mathematics.
This is a parody, but not a gross one. In fact, I do not really see what could make
one accept the first statement and not the second. (The rejoinder that modus
ponens is not framed specifically in terms of predicative truth misses the point. To
a predicativist, “truth” and “predicative truth” are the same thing, so it would not
make sense to suggest that he can reason about truth but not about predicative
truth.) If one did accept the second statement, of course, this would prevent any
use of reflection principles since absent a general grasp of modus ponens the mere
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acceptance of a set of axioms would not entitle one to globally infer the truth of all
theorems provable from those axioms.
(b) Kreisel’s second answer. A second argument in response to something like the
objection raised above was made by Kreisel ([31], §3.631) and cited with approval
by Feferman ([11], p. 134). Unfortunately, the cited passage is rather inscrutable,
so it is hard to be sure what Kreisel had in mind. I think it is something like this.
Predicativists are at any given moment only able to reason about those subsets
of ω that have previously been shown to exist. The “basic step” of predicative
reasoning is thus the passage from one level Nα of the ramified hierarchy over ω to
the next (Nα+1 = the subsets of ω definable by second order formulas relativized
to Nα). Now the proof that (a notation for) γn+1 is well-founded uses only sets
in Nγn , so once Nγn is available this proof can be executed and one can pass to
Nγn+1. However, we cannot go directly from Nγn to Nγn+2 since the proof that γn+2
is well-founded uses sets in Nγn+1 which are not yet available. Thus, we cannot
grasp the validity of the sequence of proofs as a whole since later proofs involve the
use of sets that are not known to exist at earlier stages. Each individual proof is
admissible, however, since there is a finite stage in the reasoning process at which
the sets needed for that proof become available.
This neatly answers the question raised in §1.3 as to how each proof could be
recognized as valid while the entire sequence of proofs cannot. But wait. Exactly
how would one use the well-foundedness of γn+1 proven using sets in Nγn to “pass
to Nγn+1” and make sets at that stage available for future proofs? If we accept
Kreisel’s premise then it would seem that we cannot directly go even two levels up
from Nγn to Nγn+2, let alone all the way to Nγn+1 , because the construction of
Nγn+2 uses sets in Nγn+1 which are not yet available. Thus, the argument that
prevents us from getting up to Γ0 should be equally effective at preventing us from
getting from γn to γn+1.
This point may become clearer if we ask how a predicativist could establish
the existence of Nω. Starting with N0 = ∅, he can use the basic step to directly
pass to N1, then to N2, and so on, so that for each n ∈ ω he can give a finite
proof of the existence of Nn. But in order to accept the existence of Nω he has
to somehow globally grasp that Nn exists for all n without sequentially proving
their existence one at a time. Presumably he can accomplish this by recognizing
the general principle that the existence of Nn+1 follows from the existence of Nn
and then making an induction argument. So evidently in this case he can accept
the validity of the sequence of proofs as a whole despite the fact that later proofs
involve the use of sets that are not known to exist at earlier stages. That is, just
getting up to Nω already requires some ability to reason hypothetically about sets
that are not yet available. So Kreisel’s argument (if this really is what he meant)
appears to make little sense.
However, this entire discussion is speculative until we are told precisely why the
proof that γn+1 is well-founded is supposed to legitimate passage to Nγn+1. This
takes us to Kreisel’s final argument.
(c) Kreisel’s third answer. Kreisel’s most sophisticated analysis appears in [32].
Here he rightly addresses the central question of exactly how a predicativist would
infer soundness of Sa once I(a) has been proven. On my reading, the novel idea
is that this inference (or something like it) would not be based on genuinely “un-
derstanding” the well-ordering property of a, which he now denies a predicativist
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could do, but instead would be directly extracted from the structure of the proof
of I(a). If P is the property “the (formal) definitions at a level of the [ramified]
hierarchy considered are understood if our basic concepts are understood” ([32], p.
498), then
Since we do not have an explicit definition for P . . . it seems reason-
able to suppose that the formal derivation of the well-foundedness
of β is needed . . . specifically, we expect to use the derivation as a
(naturally, infinite) schema which need be applied only to instances
of P whose meaning is determined at stage α. ([32], pp. 498-499;
italics in original)
He adds in a footnote: “It seems likely that the work of Feferman and Schu¨tte
‘contains’ all the formal details needed . . . the principal problem is conceptual: to
formulate properly just what details are needed.”
It seems even more reasonable to suppose that if, ten years after his first attempt
(in [27]) to refute the objection about (∗∗), Kreisel is still not sure how to do
this, then the objection is probably valid. Here he gives us not a fully realized
refutation, but merely a speculation as to how one might be obtained. I do not
think any attempt of this type is likely to succeed for the reasons discussed at
the beginning of this section, in particular the fact that Sa proves the existence
of arithmetical jump hierarchies up to a and this seems not to be predicatively
entailed by I(a) (cf. the end of § 2.4). Moreover, even if one could work out some
way of converting formal derivations of well-ordering in the autonomous systems
into informal verifications of soundness in some metatheory, then presumably the
metatheory and the conversion process could be formalized, and then a predicativist
should be able to apply a single instance of the formalized ω-rule to the metatheory
and deduce (∗∗) as a general principle. But again, this discussion is hypothetical.
(d) Feferman’s position. In [13] Feferman raises a version of the objection and
notes that it “involve[s] the ordinal character of the proposal via progressions, hence
[does] not apply to P [+∃/P ]” ([13], p. 85). Similar comments appear in ([14], p.
3) and ([18], p. 24). It is certainly true that the systems P + ∃/P , Ref∗(PA(P )),
and U(NFA) do not presume any special ability to reason using well-ordered sets.
However, Feferman nowhere openly repudiates the earlier systems, and I read his
remark in [14] as implying that the later systems are merely more “perspicuous”
than the earlier ones because they do not assume that predicativists have any
understanding of ordinals. As far as I know he has never addressed the argument
that a grasp of ordinals sufficient to justify (∗) would also justify (∗∗) and hence
lead one beyond Γ0.
5
1.5. The infinitary autonomous systems. In order to evaluate the infinitary
(semiformal) autonomous systems we must first clarify in exactly what way these
systems are supposed to model predicative reasoning. Surely they are not meant
to be taken literally in this regard. Perhaps we can conceive of an idealized pred-
icativist living in an imaginary world who is capable of actually executing proofs of
transfinite length, but in this case the allowed proof lengths would merely depend
on the nature of the imagined world, not on which well-ordering statements the
predicativist is able to prove.
Presumably the infinitary autonomous systems are meant to be taken as mod-
elling what an actual predicativist would consider a valid but idealized reasoning
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process. In other words, the predicativist does not himself reason within any of
these systems, but he believes that in principle they would prove true theorems
if they could somehow be implemented (in some imaginary world). On this inter-
pretation the fact that an ordinal α is autonomous within one of these systems
could lead a predicativist to accept the well-foundedness of (some notation for) α
only if he knew this fact. However, the only way he could know which ordinals
are autonomous is via some kind of meta-argument about what is provable in the
given system. This immediately suggests that he should be able to get beyond Γ0
by performing a single act of reflection on the finitary (formal) system in which he
actually reasons.
We can now see that just as in the case of the finitary autonomous systems one
is faced with a dilemma: (1) why should a predicativist believe that the fact that
some set of order type α is well-founded renders proof trees of height α valid, and
(2) granting that he can draw this inference for any particular α, why does he fail
to grasp that it is valid in general? The inference superficially seems reasonable
because it is classically valid, but it is hard to imagine what its predicative justifi-
cation could be. It is even harder to believe that a predicativist could recognize its
validity in each instance but not as a general rule.
Working only in Peano arithmetic, a predicativist should be able to draw conclu-
sions about what is provable in some infinitary system using proof trees of various
heights. But in order to infer which proof trees are actually valid, he needs some new
principle going beyond Peano arithmetic. Augmenting PA with an axiom schema
which expresses the principle “if a well-founded proof tree proves A, then A” in
some form would yield a system which proves the well-foundedness of a notation for
Γ0. Expressing the principle as a deduction rule schema rather than as an axiom
schema would yield a system which proves the well-foundedness of notations for
all ordinals less than Γ0 but not Γ0 itself, but we would need to explain why the
deduction rules are valid while the corresponding axioms are not (and we would
still be able to get beyond Γ0 by a single act of reflection). One is virtually forced
to assert that whenever a predicativist proves that a set is well-founded he is then
able to infer the validity of proof trees of that height via an unformalizable leap of
intuition, but I see no reasonable basis for such a claim.
1.6. The linked systems P and ∃/P . P+∃/P can be criticized in three different
ways.
(a) Obscure formulation. The central feature of P + ∃/P , its division into two
distinct but interacting formal systems, is so unusual that it would seem to call for
an especially careful account of the underlying motivation. Although [13] contains
a substantial amount of prefatory material, there is no explicit discussion of this
seemingly crucial point. One gets a vague sense that part of the motivation is to
allow use of second order quantifiers only during brief excursions into the “auxiliary”
system ∃/P as a sort of next-best alternative to prohibiting them altogether, but
nothing is said about why exactly this degree of usage is deemed acceptable. This
makes it difficult to evaluate P + ∃/P , since one is left with the basic question of
how we are supposed to regard the predicative meaning and reliability of statements
proven in P as opposed to those proven in ∃/P .
There apparently is some basic distinction to be made between the conceptual
content of the theorems of the two systems. I infer this from the requirement
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both in the description of allowed formulas of ∃/P ([13], p. 76) and in the rules
IV and V ([13], p. 78) that at least part of the premise specifically be proven in
P . For instance, the functional defining axioms (IV) allow the introduction of a
functional symbol provided existence of the functional has been proven in ∃/P and
its uniqueness has been proven in P . Existence can only be proven in ∃/P since
P lacks the necessary quantifiers, but no reason is given why uniqueness must be
proven in P . Would a proof of uniqueness in ∃/P be unreliable in some way? If
so, why should we trust other theorems of this system? Why are we able to justify
introducing a functional symbol when the functional’s uniqueness has been proven
in P , but not when its uniqueness has been proven in ∃/P?
The question is significant because an identical point can be made in the two
other cases, and if they were all broadened to include premises proven in ∃/P then
the system P would become superfluous: all reasoning could take place in ∃/P .
Agreeing that P is indeed dispensable is not acceptable, since this would obviate
the need for the functional defining axioms altogether and thereby void Feferman’s
justification for not allowing a predicativist to reflect on the validity of P + ∃/P
(see §1.6 (c)).
(b) Too strong. It is also unclear how to reconcile the proposed formalism sur-
rounding second order existential quantification with the motivating idea that
we have partial understanding of 2nd order existential quantifica-
tion, for example when a function or predicate satisfying an elemen-
tary condition is shown to exist by means of an explicit definition.
Some reasoning involving this partial understanding may then be
utilized, though 2nd order quantifiers are not to be admitted as
logical operators in general. ([13], p. 71; italics in original)
For example, this intuition seems somewhat incompatible with the use of negated
second order existential quantifiers, which are allowed in ∃/P . Even more prob-
lematic is the proof of transfinite recursion over well-ordered sets ([13], pp. 82-83),
which conflicts rather severely with any understanding of second order existence
in terms of “explicit definition”. The offending aspect of this proof is its use of
predicate substitution with a Σ11 formula, which is hard to reconcile with the idea
that only “some” reasoning about “partially understood” second order quantifiers
is available.6 General freedom to replace set variables with Σ11 formulas seems to
imply a complete ability to reason abstractly about second order existence.
Feferman mentions the prima facie impredicative nature of his predicate substi-
tution rule (rule V) and responds that
By way of justification for the schema V it may be argued that
the (predicative) provability of B(X) establishes its validity also
for properties whose meaning is not understood, just as one may
reason logically with expressions whose meaning is not fully known
or which could even be meaningless. ([13], p. 92)
But this line of argument would equally well justify full comprehension. Indeed, for
any formula A(n) the predicatively valid statement (∃Y )(n ∈ Y ↔ n ∈ X) yields
(∃Y )(n ∈ Y ↔ A(n)) by predicate substitution. Even if we restrict ourselves to Σ11
formulasA, we could still infer Π11 comprehension. So the idea that “the predicative
provability of B(X) establishes its validity also for properties whose meaning is not
understood” is clearly not acceptable as a general principle as it stands.
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(c) Too weak. Now consider the general objection of §1.3. Feferman addresses it
in the following way:
. . . this is not a good argument because the functional defining ax-
ioms are only given by a generation procedure and the predicative
acceptability of these axioms is only supposed to be recognized
at the stages of their generation. To talk globally about the cor-
rectness of P we have to understand globally the meaning of all
functional symbols in P ; there is no stage in the generation process
at which this is available ([13], p. 92).
The point here is that P + ∃/P contains a rule which allows one to introduce a
symbol for a functional ~α 7→ β once a unique β satisfying some formula A(~α, β)
(with ~α = (α1, . . . , αn), and all free variables in A shown) has been proven to exist
for any ~α. The αi and β are predicate variables.
I do not see how the fact that new symbols can be introduced could in itself
prevent anyone from grasping the overall validity of the system. Surely, “to talk
globally about the correctness of P” we need only to accept the validity of the func-
tional generating procedure, not necessarily “to understand globally the meaning
of all functional symbols” beforehand.7
The more substantial question is whether the validity of the functional defining
axioms of P might only be recognized in stages. Now it may be possible to imag-
ine a set of beliefs which would lead one to accept the functional defining axioms
only at the stages of their generation: perhaps someone could, by brute intuition,
accept the validity of a specific functional definition after having grasped an ex-
plicit construction of the functional being defined, yet not be able to reason about
functional existence in general terms. This seems something like the standpoint
of “immediate predicativism” discussed on pp. 73 and 91 of [13]. The problem is
that it tends to conflict with rule VII (relative explicit definition) and axiom VIII
(unification) ([13], p. 78) of ∃/P , both of which do presume an ability to reason
abstractly about second order existence (not to mention rule V, predicate substitu-
tion). Thus, Feferman’s argument belies his premise that a predicativist is capable
of accepting rule VII and axiom VIII.8
1.7. The system Ref∗(PA(P )). The Ref∗ construction applies to any schematic
formal theory, but the case of interest for us is schematic Peano arithmetic PA(P ).
This is formulated in the language L of first order arithmetic augmented by a single
predicate symbol P . The axioms are the usual axioms of Peano arithmetic with
the induction schema replaced by the single axiom
P (0) ∧ (∀n)(P (n)→ P (n′))→ (∀n)P (n),
and there is an additional deduction rule schema allowing substitution of arbitrary
formulas for P . Now if S(P ) is any schematic theory then Ref∗(S(P )) is a theory in
the language of S(P ) augmented by two predicate variables T and F whose axioms
are the axioms of S(P ) together with “self-truth” axioms governing the partial truth
and falsehood predicates T and F , and with a substitution rule which allows the
substitution of formulas possibly involving T and F for P .
(a) Too strong. In §2.5 and §2.6 I will discuss the prima facie impredicativity both
of self-applicative truth predicates and of schematic predicate variables. Leaving
those issues aside for now, the first point to make here is that the key axiom which
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distinguishes Ref∗(PA(P )) from a much weaker system Ref(PA(P )), axiom 3.2.1
(i)(P ) ([14], p. 19), has no obvious intuitive meaning. The reason for using schematic
formulas, as opposed to ordinary second order formulas involving set variables, is
that they are supposed to allow one to fully express principles such as induction
without assuming any comprehension axioms ([14], p. 8). This means that we
interpret a statement involving a schematic predicate symbol P not as making
an assertion about a fixed arbitrary set, but rather as a sort of meta-assertion
which makes an open-ended claim that the statement will be true in any intelligible
substitution instance. However, the truth claim
T (pP (n)q)↔ P (n),
a special case of 3.2.1 (i)(P ), cannot be given the latter interpretation since the
number pP (n)q does not change when a substitution is made for P in this formula.
If we interpret P in a way that is compatible with 3.2.1 (i)(P ), i.e., as indicating
membership in a fixed set, then the substitution rule P − Subst :L(P )/L(P, T, F )
([14], Definition 3.3.2 (iii)) can only be justified by an impredicative comprehension
principle (cf. [14], p. 8).
Feferman characterizes axiom 3.2.1 (i)(P ) as “relativizing T and F to P” ([14],
p. 19). I am not sure what this means, but the axiom clearly is not valid on
arbitrary substitutions for P , yet one draws consequences from it to which one does
apply a substitution rule (and this is crucial for the proof that (Π01 − CA)<Γ0 ≤
Ref∗(PA(P ))). In fairness, I should point out that this problem is noted in ([14],
§6.1.3 (i)), with the comment that “a fall-back line of defense could be that this
substitution accords with ordinary informal reasoning. However, this seems to
me to be the weakest point of the case for reflective closure having fundamental
significance.”
I would argue that the above difficulty not only invalidates the idea that
Ref∗(PA(P )) models predicative reasoning, it shows that the Ref∗ construction
indeed has no fundamental significance. There is no way to interpret the P symbol
that simultaneously makes sense of the axiom 3.2.1 (i)(P ) and the substitution rule
P − Subst :L(P )/L(P, T, F ).
(b) Too weak. The Ref∗ construction is described in [14] as a “closure” opera-
tion and the question of its significance is discussed in terms of Kripke’s theory
of grounded truth outlined in [33]. A casual reading of §6 of [14] might leave the
impression that the statements A such that Ref∗(PA(P )) proves T (pAq) are sup-
posed to be precisely the grounded true statements of the language L(P, T, F ). But
this cannot be right because these statements are recursively enumerable, so that
one can write a formula (∀n)T ({r}(n)) which asserts precisely their truth. This
formula is grounded (in any reasonable sense) and true but the assertion of its truth
is not a theorem of the system.
The more careful formulation that the self-truth axioms “correspond directly to
the informal notion of grounded truth and falsity” ([14], p. 42) is well-taken, but we
must not confuse this with the claim that the self-truth axioms capture the informal
notion. Their failure to do so can be traced to axiom (vi) ([14], Definition 3.2.1).
The first conjunct of this axiom, for example, asserts that if A(n) is true for every n
then (∀n)A(n) is true. But this does not fully capture the informal idea that “the
truth of A(n) for all n implies the truth of (∀n)A(n)” in the sense that there exist
formulas A(n) which can be proven true for each numerical value of n but such
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that there is no proof in Ref∗(PA(P )) that for all n, A(n) is true — in particular,
A(n) ≡ T ({r}(n)) where {r} enumerates all a such that Ref∗(PA(P )) proves T (a).
Now consider the claim that in general Ref∗(S(P )) encapsulates what one “ought
to accept” given that one has accepted S(P ) ([14], p. 2). This has an air of para-
dox since one has to ask whether the claim itself is something that anyone ought
to accept. However, that point is not crucial to the question of what a predica-
tivist can prove since it need not attach to the specific assertion that Ref∗(PA(P ))
encapsulates what one ought to accept given that one has accepted PA(P ). We
may suppose that the predicativist does not realize (and indeed, ought not accept)
that his commitment to Peano arithmetic obliges him to accept every theorem of
Ref∗(PA(P )), although this is in fact the case. This leads us back to the question
posed in §1.3. Evidently we are dealing with a claim that predicativists can affirm
each theorem of Ref∗(PA(P )) individually but cannot accept this system globally.
This point is not explicitly addressed in [14], but the informal notion of “partial
truth” has the flavor of a forever incomplete process and might seem like it could
support such a claim. For example, it is suggested in §6.1.1 of [14] that the pas-
sage from S(P ) to Ref(S(P )) should not be iterated because this would “vitiate the
informal idea behind the use of partial predicates of truth and falsity.” A possi-
bly more straightforward question which avoids the issue of using multiple partial
truth predicates is whether one could justify augmenting Ref∗(PA(P )) by the single
statement (∀n)T ({r}(n)) described above.
Surely a predicativist can justify adding this statement if he is able to generally
recognize that every statement proven true by Ref∗(PA(P )) is indeed true. Given
that Ref∗(PA(P )) is finitely axiomatized and that the predicativist is presumed
to accept each theorem of Ref∗(PA(P )) individually, it is unclear how this could
be plausibly denied. Indeed, axiom (vi) clearly affirms that the predicativist is
able to reason about the collective truth of an infinite set of statements themselves
involving assertions of truth and falsehood.
In §6.1.3 (ii) of [14] Feferman considers the question “have we accepted too lit-
tle?” in terms of logically provable statements, e.g. of the form A∨¬A, whose truth
is not provable because A is not grounded. This leads into a brief discussion of the
relative merits of Kripke’s minimal fixed point approach versus van Fraassen’s more
liberal “supervaluation” approach to self-applicative truth. But this discussion is
misleading because Ref∗(PA(P )) does not even prove the truth of every statement
in Kripke’s minimal fixed point; in particular, if this needs repeating, it does not
prove the statement (∀n)T ({r}(n)). This formula is not logically provable but it
is grounded, and it seems a rather stronger candidate for a statement that “ought”
to be accepted as true.
1.8. The system U(NFA). Distinct, not obviously equivalent, versions of U(NFA)
are presented in [16] and [19]. I give priority to the later version in [19].
(a) Too weak. Like Ref∗, U is presented in [19] as a general construction (“un-
folding”) which can be applied to any schematic formal system S(P ). As usual,
granting that acceptance of S(P ) justifies acceptance of every theorem of U(S(P )),
we can ask why it fails to justify accepting a formalized ω-rule schema referring
to theorems of U(S(P )). This question is not addressed in either [16] or [19]; the
closest I can find to an answer is the following passage in [16]:
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[W]e may expect the language and theorems of the unfolding of
(an effectively given system) S to be effectively enumerable, but we
should not expect to be able to decide which operations introduced
by implicit (e.g. recursive fixed-point) definitions are well defined
for all arguments, even though it may be just those with which we
wish to be concerned in the end. This echoes Go¨del’s picture of
the process of obtaining new axioms which are “just as evident and
justified” as those with which we started . . . for which we cannot
say in advance exactly what those will be, though we can describe
fully the means by which they are to be obtained. ([16], p. 10)
Here reference is made to the fact that U uses partial operations, which is seen
as having fundamental significance. It is true that the question of which partial
operations of U(NFA) are total is (unsurprisingly) not decidable, though this in
itself seems a questionable basis for forbidding us from proceeding beyond U(NFA)
when it did not prevent us from formulating this system in the first place or from
working within it.
If S(P ) involves no basic objects of type 2 (as is the case for NFA) then an
argument could be made that applying the U construction twice is conceptually
different from applying it once in that U(S(P )) does employ higher type objects
and thus the original system S(P ) can possibly be seen as being “concrete” in a
way that U(S(P )) is not. However, this should not prevent one from accepting a
formalized ω-rule schema applied to U(NFA), which would seem to require only
that one accept U(NFA) is sound.9
(b) Way too strong. U(NFA) is actually flatly impredicative in two distinct ways.
First, the U construction suffers from the same nonsensical treatment of schematic
predicates as Ref∗. Here the offending axiom is Ax 7 ([19], p. 82), which does not
make sense if P is understood as a schematic predicate. It is valid if we regard
P as indicating membership in a fixed set, but then, just as for Ref∗(PA(P )), use
of the substitution rule (Subst) ([19], p. 82) would have to presume impredicative
comprehension.
The really striking impredicativity of U(NFA), however, is its use of a least fixed
point operator, which apparently informally assumes the legitimacy of generalized
inductive definitions in the sense of [7]. This not only vitiates any claim of U(NFA)
to model predicative reasoning, it more broadly undermines the idea that U(NFA)
has any fundamental philosophical significance, since it would seem that anyone
who accepts the U construction and Peano arithmetic ought to at least accept ID1
[7], which is far stronger than U(NFA).10
1.9. Summary of the critique. At the beginning of this section I made strong
claims about the weakness of the case for the Γ0 thesis. Were they borne out?
First, I stated that each of the formal systems of §1.1 is motivated by informal
principles which actually justify a stronger system that proves the well-foundedness
of an ordered set that is isomorphic to Γ0. In the case of Σ, H , and R, the informal
principle is “a is an ordinal notation implies Sa is sound”, which is needed to justify
(∗) but in fact justifies (∗∗) (see §1.4). In H+, R+, and RA∗ the principle is “a
is an ordinal notation implies proof trees of height a are sound”. In P + ∃/P
we accept that it is legitimate to substitute arbitrary predicates for set variables,
which justifies full comprehension. Ref∗(PA(P )) assumes an informal grasp of a
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self-applicative concept of truth, which justifies the inference of a statement that
asserts the truth of every theorem proven true by Ref∗(PA(P )). U(NFA) informally
assumes the legitimacy of generalized inductive definitions, which actually justifies
ID1.
Second, I stated that the responses on record to the objection in §1.3 are brief,
vague, and unpersuasive. The only such responses of which I am aware are Kreisel’s
answers in [27], [31], and [32] (see §1.4 (a), (b), (c)) and Feferman’s answer about
P+∃/P in [13] (see §1.6 (c)). In [27] and [13] the response is barely more than a flat
assertion with no real explanation given; in [31] it is a cryptic passage whose most
reasonable interpretation is clearly self-defeating; and in [32] it is merely an implau-
sible speculation. With regard to Ref∗(PA(P )) and U(NFA), as far as I am aware
the objection has not even been discussed in the literature, except tangentially by
an argument in [14] that the Ref∗ construction should not be iterated.
Finally, I said that each of the formal systems of §1.1 is manifestly impredicative
in some way. The most blatant example of this is the least fixed point operator in
U(NFA), but in all three of P + ∃/P , Ref∗(PA(P )), and U(NFA) there is a basic
impredicativity involving the ability to substitute possibly meaningless formulas
for free set variables. In Ref∗(PA(P )) and U(NFA) this is hidden by employing a
substitution rule involving a “schematic” predicate symbol, but elsewhere treating
this predicate symbol in a way that only makes sense if it is thought of as a classical
predicate indicating membership in a fixed set.11
As I mentioned in §1.2, the reason one needs a substitution rule is because one
wants to convert statements of transfinite induction into statements of transfinite
recursion so that one can construct iterative hierarchies. In the autonomous systems
this is accomplished by simply postulating that a statement of transfinite induction
legitimates a transfinite application of reflection principles, which allows one to pass
to a stronger system that proves the existence of the next hierarchy. Thus, every
system uses an impredicative step to get from transfinite induction to transfinite
recursion. This is not surprising, as there is a predicatively essential difference
between induction and recursion (see the end of §2.4).
There is still a question as to why so many different attempted fomalizations
of predicative reasoning happen to have proof-theoretic ordinal Γ0. One answer is
that they all employ essentially the same well-ordering proof and to a substantial
extent appear to have been built around different versions of this proof. (This is
especially evident in the case of P + ∃/P .) Another possible answer is that the
earlier systems all access the same ordinals because they embody the same fallacies
revolving around the idea of autonomous generation of ordinals, while the later
systems were formulated against the background of the earlier systems which had
already seemed to attain the correct answer. This could have made it difficult
to free oneself from a conclusion that had already been formed and seemed well-
justified. However, a properly functioning scientific community should be expected
to debate and criticize major ideas, not to passively accept them, regardless of the
stature of their author and the complexity of the argument. That this apparently
was not done in a serious way in the present case suggests that the community as
a whole did not function as it should have.
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2. An analysis of predicative provability
As I discussed in §1.2 and §1.9, all of the formal systems of §1.1 employ impred-
icative methods in order to pass from transfinite induction to transfinite recursion.
This presents a basic obstacle to obtaining predicative ordinals by means of the
general technique employed by those systems. Our goal in this section is to develop
new methods of producing predicative well-ordering proofs.
Considering the variety of impredicative features that have appeared in previ-
ous attempts to model predicative reasoning (and there are two other major ones
besides those I discussed in Section 1; see §2.5 and §2.6), it seems fair to say that
not enough attention has been paid to the basic conceptual content of predica-
tivism. Therefore our discussion will incorporate a general conceptual analysis of
predicativist principles.
As many commentators have noted, the vicious-circle principle — generally taken
as the defining principle of predicativism — does not in itself constitute a well-
defined foundational stance, as it is compatible with a variety of attitudes about
which principles of set construction should be accepted as basic. Indeed, the version
of predicativism under consideration here is nowadays often referred to as “pred-
icativism given the natural numbers”, a phrasing which I find unfortunate, as it
gives no indication as to why one should take the natural numbers as basic, as
opposed to any other set. I take the essential basis for this view to be a conception
of mathematical reality according to which sets have no independent prior exis-
tence but must be constructed, together with the idea that infinite constructions
are legitimate, but only if one is able to conceive them in a completely precise and
explicit way. The special role that the natural numbers play in this account arises
from the fact that “we have a complete and clear mental survey of all the objects
being considered, together with the basic [order] interrelationships between them”
([13], p. 70). Elsewhere I term this stance mathematical conceptualism and argue
in support of it [46]. For our purposes here we may encapsulate it in three basic
principles:
(i) the mathematical universe is a variable entity that can always
be enlarged
(ii) every set must be constructible from logically prior sets
(iii) constructions of length ω are legitimate.
I take it as granted that these principles consistute a coherent foundational
stance and I am not concerned here with trying to justify them. However, a brief
explanation is in order. The idea of (i) is that there is no well-defined complete
universe of sets because any particular collection of sets can itself be identified as a
set that does not belong to the collection. Any currently available partial universe
can always be extended, and this extension process can be iterated; since we accept
constructions of length ω it can even be iterated transfinitely. But the general
concept of extension cannot be fully formalized since one can always go one step
beyond any given partial formalization.
Assertion (ii) is an informal version of the vicious circle principle. Although that
principle is notoriously difficult to formulate precisely (in particular, we do not at-
tempt to define “logically prior”), the underlying intuition seems clear enough to be
used in most cases in evaluating whether a proposed formal system is predicatively
acceptable.
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The idea behind (iii) is that we have an intuitively clear conception of what it
would be like to carry out a process (construction, computation, proof) of length
ω and therefore the results of such procedures are legitimate objects of study. By
iteration we can accept processes of length ω2, ωω, etc., but for now we leave open
just what the “etc.” entails. As with (i) we do not expect to be able to fully
formalize exactly how far we can go.
2.1. The power set of ω. Unlike naive set theory, predicativism obviously does
not support the principle “for any property A of sets, {X : A(X)} exists”. Indeed,
the intuitive appeal of this general comprehension principle seems to rest on an
implicit belief in the existence of a well-defined complete universe of sets. If there
were such a universe V , then for any definite property A one might have some idea
of forming {X : A(X)} by extracting from V just those sets satisfying A. But if
we reject the existence of such a universe then this idea fails, and in fact for many
properties A (e.g., “0 ∈ X”) we clearly cannot imagine any way to form the set of
all X ’s which satisfy A. It is important to understand that this can be so even if A
is definite in the sense that A(X) is recognized to have a well-defined truth value
for any conceivable X .
Thus, we do not accept a set as legitimate if it can only be defined “from above”
in the form {X : A(X)}. We do accept sets which can be defined by restricted
comprehension (i.e., are of the form {X ∈ Y : A(X)}) relative to a set which
has already been accepted, provided the property A is definite in the sense just
indicated,12 and we also accept sets which can be constructed “from below”. Prin-
ciple (iii) gives us a powerful ability to build up countable sets from below, but we
would not expect that we can predicatively reach any classical uncountable set in
this manner. Indeed, on the basis of the principles enumerated above it is reason-
able to assume that every predicatively acceptable infinite set should be not only
classically but predicatively countable (i.e., predicatively known to be in bijection
with ω).
For our purposes here we need not insist on such an “axiom of countability”,
but we have to accept that, at the very least, we cannot assume that the power set
of ω is a predicatively legitimate set. As explained above, this does not contradict
the definiteness of the property “X is a subset of ω”, and indeed the latter could
be justified by an appeal to (iii). Given any set X , an informal “computation” of
length ω + 1 could verify or falsify the claim that X ⊆ ω: for each n ∈ ω check
whether n belongs to X ; if so, remove it; at step ω check whether any elements
remain. Thus, the property of being a subset of ω is predicatively definite.13
2.2. Predicatively valid logic. Classical logic is unsuited to reasoning about
a variable universe. Since the general extension process by which new sets are
recognized cannot be completely formalized, the universe is inherently ill-defined
and so we do not expect every assertion about sets to have a well-defined truth
value. Rather, we should regard the family of true statements as a variable entity
which is always capable of enlargement, much like the mathematical universe itself.
This makes intuitionistic logic the appropriate tool for general predicative reasoning.
Of course, this is not to say that the predicative notion of truth can be identified
with intuitionistic truth. Predicatively there is no reason to believe (and undoubt-
edly good reason not to believe) that every true statement can be proven by a
finite argument. Conversely, for reasons I do not understand, it seems that most
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intuitionists accept impredicative constructions. Nevertheless, I maintain that the
logical apparatus of intuitionism is exactly suitable for predicativism. To say that
the law of the excluded middle always holds is just to say that every formula is
definite in the sense of §2.1. Predicatively the definiteness of any statement that
quantifies over subsets of ω is initially suspect, so it is highly implausible that a
predicativist could be led to accept even that all formulas of second order arithmetic
are definite.
For a specific example of the presumable failure of the law of the excluded middle,
notice that well-ordering assertions can apparently fail to have a well-defined truth
value because the inherent ambiguity of the mathematical universe could lead to
uncertainty about whether or not a given totally ordered set has a proper progres-
sive subset. If no such subset is currently available, indefiniteness about whether
such a subset will appear in some future enriched universe could be a reasonable
consequence of the fact that we do not know how new sets might arise. An even
sharper example is given by the set S = {n : An is true} where (An) is some
recursive enumeration of the sentences of second order arithmetic. The set S is
obviously impredicative since it is defined in terms of quantification over the power
set of ω, but if we accepted (∀n)(An ∨ ¬An) then the restricted comprehension
principle mentioned in §2.1 would allow us to form S. This shows that A ∨ ¬A
must not be assumed to hold in every case.
On the other hand, we do regard statements relativized to any well-defined par-
tial universe as definite, so that any such statement should have a well-defined truth
value. For example, in the setting of second order arithmetic, principle (iii) should
at least assure us that any arithmetical statement is definitely true or false since
we can imagine checking it mechanically. This is so even if the statement contains
set variables as parameters, since for any particular n ∈ ω and X ⊆ ω the atomic
formula “n ∈ X” has a definite truth value. Thus, at the level of arithmetical
statements our logic is classical.
Similar considerations were discussed in [8], leading to the suggestion that pred-
icativists can adopt the numerical omniscience schema
(∀n) (A(n) ∨ ¬A(n))→ [(∀n)A(n) ∨ (∃n)¬A(n)]
(where hereA is any formula of second order arithmetic and n is a number variable).
Together with the assumption A∨¬A for every atomic formula A, this implies the
law of the excluded middle for every arithmetical formula.
A word about terminology. If we do not assume the law of the excluded middle
then we may have to consider assertions whose sense is understood but which are
not known to have a definite truth value. To keep this distinction clear I will say
an assertion is meaningful if it has a definite truth value and intelligible if its sense
is understood. Thus, every meaningful assertion must be intelligible and every
intelligible assertion is potentially meaningful.
2.3. Second order quantification. First order (numerical) quantification is un-
problematic by principle (iii). The legitimacy of second order quantification is less
clear since we do not regard the power set of ω as a well-defined entity over which
set variables could be imagined ranging. This has been a recurrent concern in the
literature on predicativity. For instance, it was cited as motivation for the strong
restrictions on second order quantification in [13].
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To what extent, if any, are second order quantifiers acceptable? First, because
the concept “set of numbers” is definite (§2.1), we should at least be able to make
some limited constructive sense of existential quantification. There are situations
in which we can recognize that we are (in principle) able to construct a set of
numbers with some property, and this should license some use of second order
existential quantifiers. This was also the position taken in [13].
In addition, we do seem to be able to predicatively accept some statements as
being true of any set of numbers. Despite the unfixed nature of the mathematical
universe, we can still affirm general assertions like 0 ∈ X ∨ 0 6∈ X as holding for
any conceivable X ⊆ ω. Not only is this statement true for all currently available
sets, it must remain true in any future universe. We can be sure that we will
never come across a set for which the assertion fails because its truth is inherent
in the concept “set of numbers”. As another example, given any X ⊆ ω, principle
(iii) should justify asserting the (constructive) existence of its complement. Thus,
we ought to be able to somehow express that for every X there is a Y such that
n ∈ Y ↔ n 6∈ X . Finally, the principle of induction in the form 0 ∈ X ∧ (∀n)(n ∈
X → n′ ∈ X) → (∀n)(n ∈ X) is recognizably true for any X ⊆ ω. Given that
we accept processes of length ω, we can be certain that any set which satisfies the
induction premise must contain every number since we can imagine verifying this
conclusion mechanically. Again, this must hold not only for all currently available
sets but for all sets in any conceivable future universe.
In [18], following Russell, a distinction is drawn between the concepts “for all”
(ranging over a well-defined collection) and “for any” (ranging over a “potential
totality”). I find this distinction helpful, but in the present setting I do not accept
Russell’s suggestion, adopted in [13], that the “for any” intuition is captured by
using free set variables. Consider the following example. We have already agreed
that predicativists can acknowledge that any subset X of ω has a complement Y .
But they should then also agree that Y has properties like: for any Z, Z ⊆ Y if
and only if Z ∩X = ∅. Indeed, given any X and Z we can imagine constructing Y
(using (iii)) and then verifying the relation between X , Y , and Z (again using (iii),
specifically a version of the numerical omniscience schema, together with definite-
ness of the assertions Z ⊆ Y and Z ∩X = ∅). Since the construction of Y did not
depend on Z this means that we can affirm the statement
(∀X)(∃Y )(∀Z)(Z ⊆ Y ↔ Z ∩X = ∅)
under the interpretation ∀ = “for any” and ∃ = “there can be constructed a”. This
shows that alternating second order quantifiers can make predicative sense. More-
over, the idea cannot be expressed without using at least one universal quantifier,
which shows that Russell’s free variable suggestion is inadequate here.
An alternative possibility is to allow use of both universal and existential second
order quantifiers and to reason using an intuitionistic predicate calculus. Given
the conception of predicativism developed above and the interpretation of second
order quantifiers just indicated, this logical apparatus appears perfectly acceptable.
Intuitionistic logic legitimates the predicative use of set quantifiers.
I have been careful to restrict this discussion to sets of numbers. Using quantifiers
to range over all sets, with no qualification, is less tenable because the general
concept of a set may be predicatively unclear. To a predicativist, the assertion
that some object is a set may not only be indefinite (in the sense of §2.1) but
unintelligible (in the sense of §2.2). In fact, I believe that quantification over all
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sets is not predicatively valid for just this reason. However, I would still reject
Russell’s free variable convention here; rather, I would conclude that predicativists
simply cannot make general statements about all sets.14
(There might be ways around this difficulty. For instance, if one interprets sets
in terms of well-founded trees coded by subsets of ω, cf. §VII.3 of [43], then the
concept may become predicatively intelligible.)
2.4. Predicative well-ordering. In the previous section I justified a second order
induction statement using principle (iii). For which formulas A of second order
arithmetic would a similar argument lead us to acceptA(0)∧(∀n)(A(n)→ A(n′))→
(∀n)A(n)?
If it contains set variables, the formula A(n) might not have a definite truth
value (§2.2). However, once we have proven A(0) we must at least agree that this
instance is definitely true. If, moreover, we have proven (∀n)(A(n) → A(n′)) then
we can be successively brought to the same conclusion about A(1), A(2), etc.,
and recognizing this, we should therefore accept (∀n)A(n) as true. Regarding the
family of true statements as a variable entity always capable of enlargement, this
shows that predicativists should accept induction for every formula A(n).
This may need further explanation in light of my insistence in §1.6 (b) that it
is generally not valid to substitute arbitrary, possibly meaningless, formulas for
set variables. I stand on this assertion: for example, (∀n)(n ∈ X ∨ n 6∈ X) is
predicatively true but (∀n)(A(n) ∨ ¬A(n)) is presumably not if, e.g., A(n) asserts
that n is a Church-Kleene ordinal notation. However, this does not entail that
possibly meaningless formulas can never appear in true statements. A predicativist
should accept complete induction (provided he is using intuitionistic logic) since he
can generally recognize that the truth of the premise of any induction statement
would entail the truth of its conclusion even if the latter was not initially known to
be meaningful.
Next let us consider the extent to which predicativists can understand the general
concept of a well-ordered set. It is sometimes said that the well-ordering concept
is not available to predicativists because it involves quantification over power sets.
On the other hand, it seems to be generally accepted that predicativists are able
to assert relatively strong versions of the statement that ω is well-ordered. If we
agree with the conclusions of §2.3 then statements of transfinite induction of the
form (∀X)TI(X, a) (transfinite induction up to a on a totally ordered subset of ω)
are predicatively intelligible.15 Here I use the abbreviations
TI(X, a) ≡ Prog(X)→ (∀b ≺ a)(b ∈ X)
Prog(X) ≡ (∀b) [(∀c ≺ b)(c ∈ X)→ b ∈ X ] .
I argued above that complete induction on ω is predicatively valid. Note,
however, that if we know {b : b ≺ a} is well-ordered, i.e., we have verified
(∀X)TI(X, a), we cannot in general infer TI(A, a) (≡ Prog(A) → (∀b ≺ a)A(b)
where Prog(A) ≡ (∀b)[(∀c ≺ b)A(c)→ A(b)]) for arbitrary formulas A. The latter
schema is genuinely stronger because (∀X)TI(X, a) only asserts induction for sets
that are by assumption well-defined, whereas TI(A, a) can hold if A is not meaning-
ful, and it can even be used to prove that A(b) is meaningful for all b ≺ a. It may in
fact be the case that whenever there is a predicatively valid proof of (∀X)TI(X, a)
there is also a proof of TI(A, a) for any intelligible formula A. However, inferring
the latter statement from the former seems to me clearly predicatively illegitimate.
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2.5. Schematic assertions. Even the complete induction schema does not en-
tirely capture a predicative understanding of induction on ω since it only covers
formulas that can be written in the language that is currently in use. If the ex-
pressive power of the language were strengthened in a predicatively intelligible way,
then a predicativist should accept the induction schema for all formulas of the new
language too.
This issue is addressed in [14] and [16] by a proposal to use a “schematic” pred-
icate symbol P and to express the principle of induction in a single schematic
formula. Together with an informal commitment to continue to accept all sub-
stitution instances of this statement if the language is enriched in any intelligible
way, this does seem to fully capture a predicative understanding of induction on
ω. However, it seems unlikely that a predicativist could agree to accept such a
schematic formulation because of the circularity involved in having a formula A(P )
which contains a schematic predicate symbol P that ranges over a class of formulas
that includes A(P ). In fact, without some special justification this usage seems
clearly impredicative.
There should be no problem in using a schematic predicate symbol to range over
all formulas of a previously accepted language, or even a previously accepted set of
languages, as this would present no possibility of circularity. However, because of
the inherently impredicative quality of a self-applicative predicate variable it seems
to me that the general concept “intelligible predicate” is itself not intelligible and
that it is therefore not possible for a predicativist to legitimately make assertions
about all intelligible predicates (cf. §2.3). This leads to the conclusion that predica-
tivists have an open-ended ability to affirm induction statements on ω but are not
capable of formally expressing this fact.
The difficulties involved with schematic predicates shed light on the predicative
unacceptability of some formal systems which superficially have a strong predicative
flavor. For example, in [28] and [30] the possibility is raised that under intuitionistic
logic theories of generalized inductive definitions might be predicatively valid, and
this idea does have superficial appeal. However, on close examination there is a
clear circularity even in the intuitionistic case. This is seen as follows.
Suppose we want to introduce a predicate symbol for the class defined by some
inductive definition. Classically we could define this class “from above” as the
intersection of all classes satisfying the relevant closure condition, but this is clearly
impredicative. In the intuitionistic setting we instead conceive of the class as an
incomplete entity that can always be enlarged by repeatedly applying the closure
condition, which seems to be a predicatively legitimate idea. The problem is in
verifying the minimality property of this class. LetA be any formula in the language
of first order arithmetic enriched by a predicate symbol IX which is to represent
the class X being defined; assuming A satisfies the same closure condition as X ,
we must affirm (∀n)(IX(n) → A(n)). Now what is immediately clear from our
conception of X is that this statement is progressive in the sense that if it holds at
all previous stages in the construction of X then it will still hold at the immediately
following stage since A satisfies the same closure condition as X . This suggests that
the statement should be verified by a transfinite induction and we must therefore
imagine the stages in the construction of X as corresponding to elements of a
well-ordered set. The difficulty then lies in specifying what we mean by “well-
ordered”. If we had the ability to make assertions like TI(P, a) where P is a
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schematic predicate variable, then we could take “well-ordered” to mean “supports
transfinite induction for a schematic predicate”, and we should then be able to carry
out the transfinite induction needed to prove minimality. But if the most we can say
of any totally ordered set is that it supports transfinite induction for all formulas
of a given previously accepted language, then X cannot be conceived as being
built up along sets that support transfinite induction for formulas of a language
that includes IX . This would be circular because the well-ordering assertion would
refer to the class X which it is being used to define. But proving the minimality
statement requires that we be able to carry out transfinite induction for formulas
of this language. Hence there is no (or at least no obvious) way to predicatively
verify minimality.
Kripke-Platek set theory also has a superficial predicative plausibility, assuming
that the point raised at the end of §2.3 does not preclude any predicative treatment
of arbitrary sets, but it fails for a similar reason. Namely, the KP foundation
schema is impredicative for essentially the same reason that inductive definitions
are. For a statement of the KP axioms that is intuitionistically suitable, see, e.g.,
[5]. Their intuitionistic justification involves a conception of an incomplete universe
of sets which is built up in stages. In order to verify any instance of the foundation
schema we would therefore need to carry out a transfinite induction with respect
to the well-ordered sets along which this universe is being constructed. But the
formula being proven by induction is a formula of the language of KP and would
implicitly make reference to the universe being defined. Thus, in order to verify
the foundation schema we would need to build up the KP universe along sets that
are known to be well-ordered with respect to formulas which refer to that universe.
Again, this is circular and hence impredicative.16
2.6. Truth theories. Without using some kind of reflection principle I doubt that
predicativists can get beyond ordinals in the neighborhood of γ2 or γ3, at most.
In order to progress significantly further we need a systematic way of iterating
the process of reflecting on the truth of a given theory to get a slightly stronger
theory. One might hope to do this using a self-applicative truth predicate, as in
[14]. On its face, the predicative legitimacy of a self-applicative truth theory is
problematic — indeed, this seems just the sort of thing that predicativist principles
tend to forbid. We can try to get around the prima facie circularity of such a
theory by regarding the truth predicate as partial and built up in stages, giving it
the flavor of a generalized inductive definition. Now I argued in §2.5 that theories
of generalized inductive definitions are impredicative, but the difficulty with such
theories is their assertion of minimality axioms, which we do not require of a truth
predicate. On the contrary, the concept of belonging to an inductively defined class
does not seem predicatively objectionable on its own; for example, according to §2.4
the assertion “n is a Church-Kleene ordinal notation” is predicatively intelligible.
A parallel could also be drawn with the predicative conception of the power set
of ω as a necessarily incomplete entity that can always be enlarged. Therefore, it
seems that provided intuitionistic logic is used self-applicative truth theories could
be predicatively justifiable. The systems of [14] are firmly embedded in classical
logic, but I suppose it is likely that there is an intuitionistic version of, say, the
Ref(PA) construction of [14] that could be accepted as predicatively legitimate.
However, such a theory would presumably have proof-theoretic ordinal only in the
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neighborhood of γ2 or γ3. So self-applicative truth theories do not seem a promising
route to obtaining strong predicative well-ordering proofs.
Perhaps surprisingly, I find that it is possible to predicatively prove rela-
tively strong well-ordering assertions using hierarchies of Tarskian (i.e., non self-
applicative) truth predicates. The remainder of this paper will develop this ap-
proach.
For the sake of readability I will begin by defining a single-step Tarskian truth
theory. Let Zi1 be the theory in the language of second order arithmetic with (1)
the axioms and rules of a two-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus and (2) the
Peano axioms including induction for all formulas of Zi1. We do not assume any
comprehension axioms. For the remainder of the paper all theories will be assumed
to have the axioms and rules of a two-sorted intuitionistic predicate calculus and
to be expressed in the language of second order arithmetic possibly extended by a
countable family of unary relation symbols. For each n fix a recursive bijection
〈·, . . . , ·〉 from ωn to ω with corresponding recursive projections πi = πni , so that
πi(〈a1, . . . , an〉) = ai. I will write (a1, . . . , an) for (〈a1, . . . , an〉) below.
Definition 2.1. Let S be a formal theory which extends Zi1. Fix a Go¨del num-
bering of its formulas. Assume there exist recursive functions ax and ded such
that ax enumerates the Go¨del numbers of the axioms of S and ded enumerates
all triples 〈pAq, pBq, pCq〉 such that S has a deduction rule that infers C from A
and B (perhaps with A = B). Also fix recursive functions f and g such that if
n = pA(vi)q then f(n, i, k) = pA(k)q (i.e., all free occurences of vi are replaced by
k) and g(n, i) = p(∀vi)A(vi)q, where vi is the ith number variable symbol. If n is
not the Go¨del number of a formula, assume f(n, i, k) = g(n, i) = 0.
We define the Tarskian truth theory of S, Tarski(S), to be the theory whose
language is the language of S together with one additional unary relation symbol T
and whose non-logical axioms are those of S, with the induction schema extended
to the language of Tarski(S), together with the three axioms
T (ax(n))
T (π1(ded(n))) ∧ T (π2(ded(n)))→ T (π3(ded(n)))
(∀k)T (f(n, i, k))↔ T (g(n, i))
and the axiom schema
A(v1, . . . , vj)↔ T (pA(v1, . . . , vj)q)
for all formulas A in the language of S with no free set variables and with all free
number variables among v1, . . . , vj .
Less rigorously (but perhaps more readably), the three extra axioms of Tarski(S)
assert T (pAq) for every axiomA of S; T (pAq)∧T (pBq)→ T (pCq) whenever there is
a deduction rule of S that infers C from A and B; and the ω-rule (∀k)T (pA(k)q)↔
T (p(∀v)A(v)q). The extra axiom schema is of course just Tarski’s truth condition.
The above definition is imprecise in that one really needs to specify not merely
the functions ax, ded, f , and g but their codes (and similarly for the unnamed
function used in the final axiom schema to substitute numerals for variables in
Go¨del numbers, though this could be defined in terms of f). Moreover, these codes
must be chosen in a natural way in order to allow the formalization of proofs that
are given below only informally. The most straightforward way to handle this
rigorously would be to make the definitions explicit as primitive recursive functions
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for the systems with which we will be concerned; however, this would be somewhat
tedious and I leave the reader to convince himself that it is possible. This comment
will also apply to similar definitions that appear later.
Note that it is easy to define a provability predicate Prov in terms of
ax and ded and to show that Tarski(S) proves every instance of the schema
(∀n)[Prov(pA(n)q)→ A(n)].
The general concept of truth may or may not be philosophically problematic,
but here we are only using a limited non self-referential form which I do not think
should be controversial, even for use by a predicativist. Indeed, one could argue that
Tarski(S) minus its induction and ω-rule schemas merely formalizes the assertion
that one accepts S, and that these schemas are clearly predicatively legitimate.17
2.7. Iterated truth theories. We now describe a way to construct iterated fam-
ilies of truth theories.
Definition 2.2. Let S be a theory which extends Zi1 and let ≺ be a recursive total
order on ω. We define the iterated Tarskian truth theory of S along ≺, Tarski≺(S),
as follows. Its language is the language of S together with additional unary relation
symbols Acc and Ta (for each a ∈ ω). Its non-logical axioms are the axioms of S,
with the induction schema extended to the language of Tarski≺(S), together with
the axiom
Prog(Acc)
(stating progressivity of Acc with respect to ≺). It also has an additional set of
deduction rules whose statement requires some preparation.
Say that a formula is readable by Ta if it is a formula of the language of S
enriched by the unary relation symbols Tb for b ≺ a. Fix a Go¨del numbering
of the formulas of Tarski≺(S) such that both the function a 7→ pTaq and the
relation Rd(a, n) indicating that n is the Go¨del number of a formula readable by
Ta are recursive. We also assume there is a recursive function ax such that ax(a, ·)
enumerates the Go¨del numbers of the axioms of S together with all logical axioms
and the induction schema extended to all formulas readable by Ta, and a recursive
function ded such that ded(a, ·) enumerates the logical deduction rules extended to
all formulas readable by Ta (via triples, in the same manner as in Definition 2.1).
We also require recursive functions f and g satisfying similar modifications of the
corresponding conditions in Definition 2.1; a recursive function h such that
h(a, pAq) = pA(v1, . . . , vj)↔ Ta(pA(v1, . . . , vj)q)q
for every formula A in the language of Tarski≺(S) with no free set variables and
with all free number variables among v1, . . . , vj ; and a recursive relation Bd of
S such that Bd(pAq) holds if and only if A has no free set variables, for every
formula A of Tarski≺(S). The extra deduction rules of Tarski≺(S) then state, for
each a ∈ ω, that one can infer from Acc(a) the assertions
Ta(ax(a, n))
Ta(π1(ded(a, n))) ∧ Ta(π2(ded(a, n)))→ Ta(π3(ded(a, n)))
Rd(a, n)→ [(∀k)Ta(f(a, n, i, k))↔ Ta(g(a, n, i))]
[b ≺ a ∧ Rd(b, n) ∧ Bd(n)]→ Ta(h(b, n))
and the assertions
A(v1, . . . , vj)↔ Ta(pA(v1, . . . , vj)q)
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for all formulas A readable by Ta with no free set variables and with all free number
variables among v1, . . . , vj . This completes the definition of Tarski≺(S).
The statement Acc(a) is supposed to signify that one accepts the truth predicate
Ta. Thus, this set-up allows the presence of truth predicates which are not initially
known to be intelligible and can be reasoned with only after some criterion that
convinces us of their legitimacy is satisfied. Specifically, the criterion for accepting
Ta is that we should be assured of the intelligibility of all formulas to which it
applies, which just means that we should have accepted all prior truth predicates.
Thus, the one extra axiom of Tarski≺(S) states that Acc is progressive. The extra
deduction rules allow a predicativist, once he has accepted the truth predicate Ta,
to invoke all of the axioms appropriate to that predicate. So if a predicativist
accepts S he should also accept Tarski≺(S), for any recursive total order ≺ on ω.
The system Tarski≺(S) is open to the objection that to a limited extent it allows
one to reason with predicates Ta that are not, or not yet, known to be intelligi-
ble. A more stringent and perhaps preferrable formulation of the theory would ban
any use of formulas involving Ta until Acc(a) has been proven; this could be ac-
complished by deleting all axioms and all logical deduction rules which involve any
truth predicates, and adding new deduction rules which allow their implementation
after an appropriate acceptability statement has been proven. Similarly, if there
are concerns about interpreting Ta(n) when n is not the Go¨del number of a formula
readable by Ta, it is possible to set up a system of distinct Go¨del numberings, one
for each a ∈ ω, such that every n ∈ ω is the Go¨del number of a formula readable by
Ta in the appropriate numbering, for each a. This approach would involve heavy
use of a recursive translation function which relates distinct Go¨del numberings. In
any case the net result would be a slightly more complicated theory with precisely
the same deductive power. In particular, the results presented below would still
hold.
2.8. TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1) and Γ0. I will now present a predicatively valid system
TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1) which proves well-ordering in a strong sense for notations for every
ordinal less than Γ0. The interest of this system is that it shows that every ordinal
less than Γ0 is predicatively provable. This claim has been made many times be-
fore, but as I pointed out in Section 1, all previous efforts have crucially involved
impredicative reasoning. Moreover, it will be evident that the present construction
can easily be pushed further to obtain predicative well-ordering proofs for nota-
tions for even larger ordinals. I will describe stronger systems that go significantly
further in §2.9 and §2.10.
Definition 2.3. Let ≺ be a standard recursive ordering of ω of order type
Γ0 whose least elements are 0 and 1. We write TarskiΓ0 for Tarski≺. Define
Tarski0Γ0(Z
i
1) = Z
i
1 and inductively set Tarski
n+1
Γ0
(Zi1) = TarskiΓ0(Tarski
n
Γ0(Z
i
1)).
Observe that Tarskin+1Γ0 (Z
i
1) extends Tarski
n
Γ0(Z
i
1). Let Tarski
ω
Γ0(Z
i
1) be the union
of the theories TarskinΓ0(Z
i
1).
I argued in §2.7 that if a predicativist accepts a theory S then he should also
accept Tarski≺(S) for any recursive total order ≺. In particular, if he accepts S he
should also accept TarskiΓ0(S). Granting that he accepts Z
i
1, by iteration he should
accept each TarskinΓ0(Z
i
1), and recognizing this he should also accept Tarski
ω
Γ0(Z
i
1).
Now there is no reason to stop at ω, and by going further we can obtain predicative
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well-ordering proofs of larger ordinals. In particular, Tarski(TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1)) proves
that a notation for Γ0 is well-ordered, yielding the falsification of the Γ0 thesis
promised in the title and at the beginning of Section 1.
The well-ordering proof is based on the following lemma. Let an be the notation
for γn according to ≺. If a is the notation for α and b is the notation for β then
let a +˙ b be the notation for α + β, ω˙a the notation for ωα, etc. (Let a · b be the
notation for αβ.) We may assume that these are all recursive functions of a and b.
Lemma 2.4. Let S be a formal theory that extends Zi1 and satisfies all assumptions
needed in Definition 2.2. Then for any n ∈ ω, TarskiΓ0(S) plus the transfinite
induction schema TI(A, an) for every formula A in its language proves TI(A, an+1)
for every formula A in the language of S.
Proof. For n = 0 one simply carries out the proof of Lemma 1 on page 180 of [42]
within Tarski(S). Thus, fix n ≥ 1. Let Ba,b(m) be the formula
Ba,b(m) ≡ (∀z)
[
Rd(ω˙a · b, z) ∧ Bd(z)→ Tω˙a·b(pProg[[z]]→ J ([[z]], φ˙a(m))q)
]
where
J (A, a) ≡ (∀y)
[
(∀x ≺ y)A(x)→ (∀x ≺ y +˙ a)A(x)
]
and the [[z]] notation indicates that the formula with Go¨del number z is to be
inserted at that point. Note that Ba,b(m) is not a single formula in the language
of TarskiΓ0(S) because of the presence of the varying unary relation symbols Tω˙a·b,
but
C(a) ≡ (∀b) [0 ≺ b ≺ an → Tan(pProgm Ba,b(m)q)]
is a single formula with parameter a.
Since Acc is progressive, the hypothesis about transfinite induction yields
Acc(an), so that the axioms for Tan are available. We will use them to prove
in TarskiΓ0(S) that C(a) is progressive over a ≺ an. First, C(0) can be proven by
carrying out, within Tan , the proof of Lemma 1 on page 180 of [42]. C(a) holds at
limit values of a if it holds at all smaller values by a straightforward verification
using the facts that φa(0) = supa˜≺a φa˜(0), φa(m) = φa˜(φa(m)) for all a˜ ≺ a, and
φa(m + 1) = supa˜≺a φa˜(φa(m) + 1), all of which are provable in Z
i
1. At successor
stages, we assume C(a) and prove C(a+˙1) as follows. Fix 0 ≺ b ≺ an and m ∈ ω
and, working within Tan , suppose Ba+˙1,b(m) holds; we must prove Ba+˙1,b(m+˙1).
This will verify progressivity at successor stages. Ba+˙1,b(m) is proven similarly for
m = 0, and it is trivial at limit stages assuming it holds at all previous stages.
The following argument is carried out within Tan . To prove Ba+˙1,b(m+˙1), ob-
serve that (by C(a)) Ba,r·b(s) is progressive in s for all r ≺ ω˙. Since Ba,r·b(s) is
readable by Tω˙a+˙1·b and has no free set variables, the hypothesis that Ba+˙1,b(m)
holds then implies
J (Ba,r·b(s), φ˙a+˙1(m))
for all r. Fixing j, r ≺ ω˙ we successively infer
J (Ba,(r+˙j)·b(s), φ˙a+˙1(m))
and hence
Ba,(r+˙j)·b(φ˙a+˙1(m)+˙1);
then if j  1, since Ba,(r+˙j−˙1)·b(s) is readable by Tω˙a·(r+˙j)·b,
J (Ba,(r+˙j−˙1)·b(s), φ˙a(φ˙a+˙1(m)+˙1))
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and hence
Ba,(r+˙j−˙1)·b(φ˙a(φ˙a+˙1(m)+˙1));
and so on, down to
Ba,r·b(φ˙
j
a(φ˙a+˙1(m)+˙1)).
Since j ≺ ω˙ is arbitrary, this implies
Ba,r·b(φ˙a+˙1(m+˙1)),
and since this is true for all r ≺ ω (and every formula readable by Tω˙a+˙1·b is readable
by Tω˙a·r·b for some r), we infer Ba+˙1,b(m+˙1), as desired.
We conclude that C(a) is progressive, so our hypothesis about transfinite induc-
tion yields C(a) for all a ≺ an. Taking b = 1 and m = 0, we infer
(∀a ≺ an)Tan(pBa,1(0)q).
In particular, for every formula A in the language of S with no free set variables
and one free number variable we have
(∀a ≺ an)Tan(pProgA → J (A, φ˙a(0))q)
and therefore
ProgA → (∀a ≺ an)J (A, φ˙a(0))
and finally (since an+1 = φan(0) = supa≺an φa(0))
ProgA → (∀a ≺ an+1)A(a).
This proves TI(A, an+1) for every formula A in the language of S with no free set
variables and one free number variable. We can reduce to this case by replacing an
arbitrary formula A with the formula Prog(A) → A and then universally quanti-
fying all parameters. This yields a formula which is automatically progressive and
we conclude by the above that it holds for all a ≺ an+1; interchanging the order of
universal quantifiers then yields Prog(A)→ (∀a ≺ an+1)A(a). 
This lemma could also be proven by adapting the proof of Theorem 3 in [19]. The
point is that one can model the jump hierarchy used there by using the recursion
theorem to find r ∈ ω such that
{r}(0,m) = pA(m)q
and for all a ≻ 0
{r}(a,m) = p(∀z)[z ≺ a→ J (Ta({r}(z, x)), φ˙(e(a),m))]q,
both provably in Zi1. Setting B(a,m) ≡ Tan+˙1({r}(a,m)), we can then prove in
TarskiΓ0(S) that for all a  an
B(a,m)↔ (∀z)[z ≺ a→ J (B(z, x), φ˙(e(a),m))].
The argument used to prove Theorem 3 of [19] can then be used to complete the
proof of the lemma. (It can even be slightly simplified because ωγn = γn for n ≥ 1
and the condition h(a)  z is not really necessary, there or here.) However, the
proof given above generalizes better to the situation in §2.9 and §2.10.
Theorem 2.5. TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1) proves transfinite induction up to any ordinal less
than Γ0 for all formulas in its language.
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Proof. Inductive application of the lemma shows that TarskinΓ0(S) proves transfinite
induction up to γn for all formulas of S. Applying this result with S = Tarski
k
Γ0(Z
i
1)
for arbitrary n and k, and observing that every formula of TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1) is a formula
of TarskikΓ0(Z
i
1) for some k, we obtain the desired result. 
The main point of this proof is that we finesse the induction versus recursion
issue encountered in Section 1 by proving a stronger result, namely that transfinite
induction holds for arbitrary formulas rather than just for sets.
I believe this is the first predicatively valid demonstration of the well-foundedness
of notations for all ordinals less than Γ0. Now its predicative validity requires the
validity of three stages of abstraction: reasoning using Tarskian truth predicates
(going from S to Tarski(S)), reasoning about which of a sequence of truth predicates
are acceptable (going from S to Tarski≺(S)), and iterating the preceding step (going
from S to Tarskiω≺(S)).
If we grant that a predicativist can always pass from S to Tarski≺(S), then he
should be able to consider the sequence of theories Tarskin≺(S) and reason that the
validity of each one implies the next, hence they are all valid and therefore so is
Tarskiω≺(S). Thus, if we accept the second stage then we should also accept the third
stage. Conceivably one could try to make a case that a predicativist can pass to
Tarskin+1≺ (S) once he has actually accepted Tarski
n
≺(S) but he cannot recognize that
this passage is valid in general. This would enable him to accept each Tarskin≺(S)
but not Tarskiω≺(S). Presumably the idea would be that predicativists are capable
of making individual judgements about the acceptability of particular theories but
cannot reason about the acceptability of theories in general. However, it would seem
that one could with equal justice replace “theories” with “truth predicates” in this
assertion, yielding the claim that predicativists can make individual judgements
about whether to accept particular truth predicates but cannot reason about such
questions abstractly, which would render Tarski≺(S) illegitimate. In other words,
we have just as much reason to go from the second stage to the third as we do to
go from the first stage to the second.
On the other hand, if we reject passage from the first stage (accepting Tarski(S))
to the second (accepting Tarski≺(S)) I think it would have to be on the grounds
just suggested, i.e., that predicativists are capable of making individual judgements
about the acceptability of particular truth predicates but cannot reason abstractly
about their acceptability in general. But then we could just as well replace “truth
predicates” with “statements” and argue that predicativists can make individual
judgements about whether to accept particular statements but cannot reason about
such questions abstractly. This would render Tarski(S) illegitimate. But not only
that; as I pointed out in §1.4 (a), this line of argument, if accepted, would actually
prevent a predicativist from recognizing modus ponens, or really any deduction rule,
as a general principle. In fact it ought to forbid any use of statements involving
variables of any kind since these already imply an ability to reason hypothetically
about the truth of such a statement on all possible substitutions of values for the
variables, which evidently requires some abstract sense of truth or acceptability.
Ultimately we would be left only with the ability to make concrete numerical asser-
tions. The point is that there is a smooth progression in reasoning at successively
higher levels of abstraction that takes one from Peano arithmetic up to TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1)
and beyond, so that any attempt to cut this progression off at some point is bound
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to appear arbitrary. At any rate there is no better reason to cut it off at Γ0 than
anywhere else.
The element of truth to the objection is that the general concept of statements
“being predicatively acceptable” is impredicative when there is no limitation on
the domain of discussion, because it would be circular to talk about the predica-
tive acceptability of statements which themselves involve the concept of predicative
acceptability. Similarly, the ideas of truth predicates being predicatively accept-
able or of theories being predicatively acceptable are impredicative as unrestricted
general concepts. But these are just versions of the fact noted in §2.5 that the
general concept of “being intelligible” is not itself intelligible. In each of these
cases, if attention is restricted to a well-defined previously grasped domain, I see
no impredicativity.
2.9. Tarskiωκκ(Z
i
1) and φΩ2(0). In the last section we considered a formal system,
TarskiΓ0(Z
i
1), in which we were able to reason about the (predicative) acceptability
of a hierarchy of truth predicates by means of an additional predicate Acc. The
TarskiΓ0 construction was then iterated ω times. By systematizing the process
of iterating constructions involving acceptability predicates we can access ordinals
well beyond Γ0. I will next illustrate this claim by describing a predicatively valid
formal system that proves well-ordering statements for notations for all ordinals
less than the Ackermann ordinal φΩ2(0). In §2.10 I will sketch a way to carry
the construction further and get a predicative well-ordering proof for the “small”
Veblen ordinal φΩω (0).
The development is similar to that in §2.8 and will be presented here in slightly
less detail. Let κ = φΩΩ(0) and fix a notation system for κ
κ (e.g., see the intro-
duction to [34]). In the following I will identify ordinals with their notations and I
will use α, β, γ to range over ordinals ≺ κ and a, b, c to range over ordinals ≺ κκ.
Every nonzero a can be uniquely written in the form a = κα1β1 + · · · + καnβn
such that α1  · · ·  αn; αi = αi+1 implies βi  βi+1; and each βi is either 1
or a limit ordinal. Let h(a) = κα1β1 + · · · + καn−1βn−1. We define the canonical
sequence associated to a to be {h(a) + καnγ : γ ≺ βn} if βn is a limit ordinal; if
βn = 1 and αn = 0 then it is the single element {h(a)}; if βn = 1 and αn is a
limit ordinal it is {h(a) + κγ : γ ≺ αn}; and if βn = 1 and αn = α˜n + 1 then it is
{h(a) + κα˜nγ : γ ≺ κ}. In the last case (βn = 1 and αn a successor) we say that a
is of type 1, and otherwise it is of type 0. (Cf. Definition 1 of [22].) We consider 0
to be of type 0 and we let its canonical sequence be empty. Let Typ0 be a formula
such that Typ0(a) holds if and only if a is of type 0, and let Seq be a formula such
that Seq(x, a) holds if and only if x belongs to the canonical sequence associated
to a.
Definition 2.6. Let S be a theory which extends Zi1. We define Tarskiκκ(S) as
follows. It language is the language of S together with a unary relation symbol Acc
and two families of unary relation symbols Ta and Acca. In this setting a formula is
readable by Ta if it is a formula of the language of S enriched by the unary relation
symbols Tb and Accb for all b ≺ a. The non-logical axioms are the axioms of S,
with the induction schema extended to the larger language, together with an axiom
which states that for any a, if a is of type 0 with associated canonical sequence (xγ)
then (∀γ)Acc(xγ)→ Acc(a), and if a is of type 1 with canonical sequence (xγ) then
Progγ Acc(xγ) → Acc(a). We also have, for each a, a family of deduction rules
allowing inference from the premise Acc(a) of the following statements:
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(I) Axioms for Ta: the same as in Definition 2.2, i.e.,
Ta(ax(a, n))
Ta(π1(ded(a, n))) ∧ Ta(π2(ded(a, n)))→ Ta(π3(ded(a, n)))
Rd(a, n)→ [(∀k)Ta(f(a, n, i, k))↔ Ta(g(a, n, i))]
[b ≺ a ∧Acca(b) ∧ Rd(b, n) ∧ Bd(n)]→ Ta(h(b, n))
A(v1, . . . , vj)↔ Ta(pA(v1, . . . , vj)q),
with the premise Acca(b) added to the fourth axiom. The functions appearing
in these axioms are defined analogously to those in Definition 2.2, and the same
condition is placed on A in the final schema.
(II) Axioms for Acca:
Seq(b, a)→ Acca(b) (if a is of type 0)
Progb [Seq(b, a)→ Acca(b)] (if a is of type 1)
[b ≺ a ∧Acca(b) ∧ Typ0(b)]→ Ta (p(∀c)[Seq(c, b)→ Accb(c)]q)
[b ≺ a ∧Acca(b) ∧ ¬Typ0(b)]→ Ta (pProgc[Seq(c, b)→ Accb(c)]q)
[c ≺ b ≺ a ∧Acca(b)]→ [Acca(c)↔ Ta(pAccb(c)q)]
b ≺ a→ [Acc(b)↔ Acca(b)]
This completes the definition of Tarskiκκ(S).
As in Definition 2.3 we now inductively define Tarski0κκ(Z
i
1) = Z
i
1 and
Tarskin+1κκ (Z
i
1) = Tarskiκκ(Tarski
n
κκ(Z
i
1)), and we let Tarski
ω
κκ(Z
i
1) be the union
of the theories Tarskinκκ(Z
i
1).
The system Tarskiωκκ(Z
i
1) is predicatively justified by taking one step up in ab-
straction beyond TarskiΓ0(Z
i
1). There we had a theory involving a hierarchy of
truth predicates and we formally reasoned about their acceptability. Here we have
a hierarchy of acceptability predicates, each of which allows us to reason about the
acceptability of truth and acceptability predicates of lower degree, and about whose
acceptability we are able to formally reason. Intuitively, if a is of type 0 then the
acceptability predicate at level a is supposed to affirm the acceptability of all levels
belonging to the canonical sequence associated to a, and if a is of type 1 then it is
supposed to affirm progressivity of the acceptability of the levels belonging to the
canonical sequence associated to a.
Just as with Definition 2.2 it is possible to formulate a stricter definition which
would disallow any use of Ta and Acca until after Acc(a) has been proven. We could
also set up a family of distinct Go¨del numberings so that truth predicates could
only refer to formulas readable by them, and similarly we could set up a family
of distinct orderings of ω, one of order type a for each a, so that acceptability
predicates could only refer to prior truth and acceptability predicates. As before,
these changes would be merely cosmetic and would not affect the strength of the
theory.
The well-ordering proof is based on two lemmas.
Lemma 2.7. Let S be a formal theory that extends Zi1 and satisfies all assumptions
needed in Definition 2.6. Then Tarskiκκ(S) proves that the statement
A(α) ≡ (∀a) [Acc(a)→ Acc(a+ κα)]
is progressive in α.
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Proof. For any a the canonical sequence associated to a + 1 is {a}, so an axiom
of Tarskiκκ(S) asserts that Acc(a) → Acc(a + 1). This shows that A(0) is prov-
able in Tarskiκκ(S). At successor stages, suppose A(α) holds and, reasoning in
Tarskiκκ(S), deduce that for any a satisfying Acc(a) the statement Acc(a + κ
αβ)
is progressive in β. This yields Acc(a) → Acc(a + κα+1), and we infer A(α + 1).
Finally, suppose α is a limit and we have A(γ) for all γ ≺ α. Then for any a such
that Acc(a) holds we have Acc(a+ κγ) for all γ ≺ α, and this implies Acc(a+ κα).
So we infer A(α). 
Let δ0 = 1 and δn+1 = φΩ·δn(0), so that φΩ2 (0) = supn∈ω δn. Note that ωκ = κ,
so (κω)α equals κα if α is a limit and it equals καω if α is a successor.
Lemma 2.8. Let S be a formal theory that extends Zi1 and satisfies all assumptions
needed in Definition 2.6. Then Tarskiκκ(S) plus the transfinite induction schema
TI(A, δn) for every formula A in its language proves TI(A, δn+1) for every formula
A in the language of S.
Proof. The technique is similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 2.4. Define
Bα,b(µ) ≡ (∀z)
[
Rd((κω)αb, z) ∧ Bd(z)→ T(κω)αb(pProg[[z]]→ J ([[z]], φΩα(µ))q)
]
and
C(α) ≡ (∀b)
[
0 ≺ b ≺ κδn ∧ Typ0(b) ∧Accκδn ((κω)
αb)→ Tκδn (pProgµ Bα,b(µ)q)
]
.
By Lemma 2.7 and the transfinite induction hypothesis we obtain Acc(a) →
Acc(a + κα) for all α ≺ δn. In particular, Acc(κα) holds for all α ≺ δn, and this
implies Acc(κδn). We also obtain Acc(a) → Acc(a + καr) for all α ≺ δn and all
r ≺ ω, which implies Acc(a)→ Acc(a+ καω) for all α ≺ δn.
We claim that C(α) is progressive over α ≺ δn. C(0) is again essentially Lemma
1 on page 180 of [42]. Next, let α be a limit and suppose C(β) holds for all β ≺ α.
Fix 0 ≺ b ≺ κδn of type 0 and suppose Accκδn ((κω)
αb). Then for every β ≺ α and
every x in the canonical sequence associated to b, letting y = (κω)α˜x + 1 where
β + α˜ = α, we have Accκδn ((κω)
βy) and so C(β) implies progressivity in µ of the
assertion that T(κω)βy(pProg[[z]] → J ([[z]], φΩβ(µ))q) holds for all appropriate z.
Since every formula readable by T(κω)αb is readable by T(κω)βy for sufficiently large
x and β and φΩα enumerates the common values of φΩβ over β ≺ α, this implies
the desired conclusion.
Finally, suppose C(α) holds for some α ≺ δn; we must verify C(α + 1). To do
this fix 0 ≺ b ≺ κδn of type 0 and suppose Accκδn ((κω)
α+1b). We may assume b
is a successor, b = b˜ + 1, since progressivity of Bα+1,b(µ) for these values implies
progressivity for type 0 limits by an argument similar to the one used in the previous
paragraph. Now, as in the proof of Lemma 2.4, progressivity at limit values of µ
follows from continuity of φΩ(α+1), and progressivity at µ = 0 is proven in the same
way as progressivity at successor values of µ. Therefore we consider the successor
case. Fix µ ≺ κ and, working within Tκδn , suppose Bα+1,b˜+1(µ) holds; we must
prove Bα+1,b˜+1(µ+ 1).
Let γ˜0 = φΩ(α+1)(µ) + 1 and inductively define γ˜n+1 = φΩα+γ˜n(0), so that
φΩ(α+1)(µ + 1) = supn≺ω γ˜n. In order to verify Bα+1,b˜+1(µ + 1), it will therefore
suffice to check T(κω)α+1b(pProg[[z]]→ J ([[z]], γ˜n)q) for arbitrary n (and appropri-
ate z). Working within Tκδn , we can nowmimic the proof of Lemma 2.4 to show that
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transfinite induction up to γ˜n for all formulas readable by T(κω)α+1b˜+(κω)ακ(r+1) im-
plies transfinite induction up to γ˜n+1 for all formulas readable by T(κω)α+1b˜+(κω)ακr.
By the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 2.5 we then get transfinite
induction up to any γ˜n for formulas readable by any T(κω)α+1b˜+(κω)ακr, i.e., for all
formulas readable by T(κω)α+1b. In this argument γ˜n replaces an, the expression
ωab is modified to
(κω)α+1b˜+ (κω)ακr + (κω)αωα˜β˜
(where a and b are replaced by α˜ and β˜), φa is modified to φΩα+α˜, and the hy-
pothesis that C(α) holds replaces use of Lemma 1 on page 180 of [42]; otherwise
the argument is identical. We conclude that C(α) is progressive.
The remainder of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.4. 
Theorem 2.9. Tarskiωκκ(Z
i
1) proves transfinite induction up to any ordinal less
than φΩ2 (0) for all formulas in its language.
Proof. By reasoning identical to that used in the proof of Theorem 2.5. 
2.10. Tarskiωλλω (Z
i
1) and φΩω (0). It is possible to strengthen the construction of
§2.9 to obtain a predicative well-ordering proof for notations for all ordinals less
than the “small” Veblen ordinal φΩω (0). I will only sketch the construction and I
will omit all proofs.
Let λ = φΩΩω (0) and fix a notation system for λ
λω . Every ordinal a less than
λλ
ω
can be uniquely written in the form a = λα1β1+ · · ·+λαnβn with each αi ≺ λω;
each βi ≺ λ; α1  · · ·  αn; αi = αi+1 implies βi  βi+1; and each βi either a
limit or 1. Write αn = λ
γ1δ1 + · · ·+ λγmδm with similar conditions on the γi and
δi (but now each γi ≺ ω). If βn is a limit or if βn = 1 and δm is a limit then
we say that a is of type 0; if βn = δm = 1 then a is of type γm + 1. Canonical
associated sequences are defined just as before in the type 0 case, for type 1 we
take the canonical associated sequence to be
{h(a) + λλ
γ1δ1+···+λ
γm−1δm−1 · α : α ≺ λ},
and for higher types we take it to be
{h(a) + λλ
γ1δ1+···+λ
γm−1δm−1+λ
γm−1α : α ≺ λ},
where h(a) = λα1β1 + · · · + λαn−1βn−1. The Tarskiλλω (S) construction goes like
the Tarskiκκ(S) construction, with the following elaboration. Define a bounded
jumpability predicate
J 1a,b(A, c) ≡ (∀a  x ≺ b) [A(x)→ A(x + c)]
and inductively define a bounded k-th order jumpability predicate J ka,b(A, c) by
J k+1a,b (A, c) ≡ (∀a  x ≺ b)
[
J ka,b(A, x)→ J
k
a,b(A, x+ c)
]
.
Accepting level a of the truth and acceptability hierarchy affiliated to Tarskiλλω (S)
should then entail accepting level h(a) as well as: if a is type 0, accepting all levels
in its associated sequence; if a is type 1, accepting progressivity of the acceptability
of the levels in its associated sequence; and if a is of type k ≥ 2, accepting
Progα≺λJ
k−1
h(a),a(Acc, λ
λγ1δ1+···+λ
γm−1δm−1+λ
γm−1α).
The axiomatization of Tarskiλλω (S) is similar to the axiomatization of Tarskiκκ(S),
with natural modifications to accomodate higher types. We define Tarskiωλλω (Z
i
1) by
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induction as usual. By a more complicated but not essentially different argument
from the proof of Theorem 2.9, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2.10. Tarskiωλλω (Z
i
1) proves transfinite induction up to any ordinal less
than φΩω (0) for all formulas in its language.
In this proof the analog of Lemma 2.7 asserts that for each k ≺ ω, Tarskiλλω (S)
proves Acc(λλ
k
). Then the analog of Lemma 2.8 asserts that Tarskiλλω (S) plus
transfinite induction up to δ˜n for all formulas in its language proves transfinite
induction up to δ˜n+1 for all formulas in the language of S, where δ˜1 = 1 and
δ˜n+1 = φΩkδn(0). (This proof is carried out using truth and acceptability at level
λλ
k−1
ω.)
As with TarskiωΓ0(Z
i
1) we can go one step further and conclude that the Ve-
blen ordinal is itself predicatively provable. Although φΩω (0) is not terribly large
among the scale of proof-theoretically important countable ordinals, this result is
still significant. Probably the most celebrated example of an allegedly impredica-
tive mainstream theorem, Kruskal’s theorem (see, e.g., [21]), is now seen to be
predicatively justified. It is equivalent over a weak base system to the well-ordering
of a notation for φΩω (0) [38].
It should not be difficult to strengthen Theorem 2.10 so as to prove the well-
foundedness of a notation for the “large” Veblen ordinal φΩΩ(0). But I expect
that substantially larger ordinals can be accessed using predicative methods. This
raises the possibility of a version of Hilbert’s program in which theories are justi-
fied via predicative, rather than finitary or intuitionistic, consistency proofs. The
preceding results indicate that this program is interesting, substantial, and open
to exploration. Moreover, if predicativism given the natural numbers — or, as I
prefer to call it, mathematical conceptualism [46] — is right, this program is of
fundamental significance for the foundations of mathematics.
1. Other concerns may include the awkwardness of predicative systems in practice and a sense
that they are philosophically, as opposed to mathematically, too limiting. I address these issues
in separate papers [46, 47].
2. Yet another idea is to assert that we merely believe that A could come to accept every statement
in S, but we do not know this. If so, it is possible that A could indeed share this belief, but without
sufficient certainty to allow him to go beyond S.
Whether this tactic could work depends on exactly why we have reservations about what A
can accept. It is no good, for example, to say that we are not sure what an ideal predicativist can
accept because there is more than one version of predicativism, since we can hardly assume that
he is unable to decide which version he prefers. Nor would the argument hold up if our uncertainty
were caused by not knowing whether A could accept some specific principle P , as this would be
tantamount to A failing to decide between two versions of his theory.
The argument might succeed if there were an infinite sequence of principles (Pn) each one of
which A might accept or reject. A case could then be made that we cannot demand that he make
a simultaneous decision on the validity of every Pn. However, this now seems to be a version of
the idea that A can accept each Pn individually but not the entire sequence (Pn), which is the
sort of claim I address in the main text.
3. The H system in [10] follows this description precisely. Systems of ramified analysis like Σ and
R are a little more complicated in that each Sa has its own set variables Xa, and legal formulas of
Sa must contain only set variables Xb with b  a. These systems are formally more complicated
than H, but they are supposed to more transparently model the intuition of a predicative universe
which is only available in stages.
4. According to the proof sketched in [10] that Γ0 ≤ Aut(S), we can find r ∈ ω which is the Go¨del
number of a recursive function {r} with {r}(n) a notation for γn, {r}(n) <O {r}(n
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S0 ⊢ (∀n) ProvS{r}(n)(pI({r}(n+ 1))q). Letting A(n) ≡ I({r}(n + 1)) and substituting {r}(n)
for a in (∗∗), a simple induction argument yields (∀n) I({r}(n)) (note that S0 supports complete
induction), from which we deduce I(a) with a = 3 · 5r .
(The expression A({r}(x)) should be understood as an abbreviation of a formula which asserts
that there exists y such that {r}(x) = y and A(y). Alternatively, we can assume a language that
contains symbols for all primitive recursive functions and reword the arguments — here and below
— to ensure that all recursive functions in use are actually primitive recursive.)
5. In [17] Feferman refers to “the argument that the characterization of predicativity requires one
to go beyond predicative notions and principles” ([17], footnote 6), which sounds like it could be
a version of the general objection of §1.3. However, his response (“But the predicativist . . .”, p.
316) seems aimed merely at showing that the set of all predicatively provable ordinals is not a
predicatively valid set, a view that I agree with (though not for the reason given there). This
should not prevent a predicativist from understanding the assertion that every an is an ordinal
notation, in the notation of §1.3.
One could possibly make an argument that the statement (∀n) I(an) cannot even be pred-
icatively recognized as meaningful, let alone true, on the ground that the general concept of
well-ordering is not available to a predicativist. Perhaps this is the point of the comment in [17].
Presumably the idea would be that each I(an) can only be understood as a sensible assertion
once it is proven and not before. This seems like a difficult position to defend, but in any case
it would void the main argument because if one did accept that some theorems of San cannot be
recognized as meaningful until they are actually proven, this would invalidate any use of reflection
principles in the first place.
6. Note that the final L in rule V, predicate substitution ([13], p. 78), should be L∃.
7. Of course, the validity of the functional generating procedure hinges on the validity of ∃/P ,
so it may be significant that Feferman refers to “the correctness of P” and not “the correctness
of P in conjunction with ∃/P”. This goes back to the question raised in §1.6 (a) about whether
predicativists can trust theorems proven in ∃/P , and if not, why it makes sense for them to use
this system at all.
8. For the argument to work we have to be able to imagine someone who can think, for example,
whenever it is the case that for every number n and any ~α there exists a β
satisfying A(~α, n, β), for any ~α these β’s can be unified into a single γ satisfying
A(~α, n, γn) for all n
but who cannot think
whenever for any ~α a unique β exists satisfying A(~α, β), I can introduce a
functional symbol F such that A(~α, F (~α)) holds for any ~α,
yet who can think
I can introduce a functional symbol F such that A(~α, F (~α)) holds for any ~α
once he has actually proven, for any particular A, the existence for any ~α of a unique β satisfying
A(~α, β). This combination of abilities and deficits strikes me as incoherent.
9. Another questionable point in the “too weak” category is the restriction on allowed types in
([19], p. 81). I do not understand the justification given there, and a corresponding restriction is
not made in the system sketched in [16]. In light of footnote 2 of [19], this raises the question
whether U(NFA) as described in [16] really does have proof-theoretic ordinal Γ0.
10. On the other hand, the minimality property of LFP (Ax 4 (ii), p. 79) is never used in [19],
so this axiom could be eliminated without affecting the proof-theoretic strength of U(NFA). The
existence of not necessarily minimal fixed points might be predicatively justifiable if intuitionistic
logic is used; see the discussion of inductively defined classes at the beginning of §2.6. However,
this more careful analysis also reveals a fundamental impredicativity in using schematic variables,
a point not discussed above; see §2.5.
11. I should point out that Ferferman has in several places openly called attention to impredicative
aspects of various of his systems. The impredicativity of the autonomous systems is commented
on in ([13], p. 85), ([14], p. 3), and elsewhere. (“the well-ordering statement . . . on the face of it
only impredicatively justifies the transfinite iteration of accepted principles up to a.” “. . . prima
facie impredicative notions such as those of ordinals or well-orderings.”) The impredicativity of
P + ∃/P is noted in ([13], p. 92). (“In P we think of ‘X’ as ranging over predicates recognized
to have a definite meaning; this would not seem to admit the properties expressed by formulas of
L∃.”) The impredicativity of Ref
∗(PA(P )) is noted in ([14], pp. 41 and 42). (“one may question
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substituting possibly indeterminate formulas . . . this seems to me to be the weakest point of the
case for reflective closure having fundamental significance.” “this may involve some equivocation
between the notions of being definite . . . and being determinate”)
12. (Perhaps also assuming that we know Y to be countable so that the subset can be extracted
using principle (iii); but see below.)
13. I am deliberately avoiding the question of what sets “really are”. The argument in this
paragraph suggests a quasi-physical conception according to which one could imagine actually
manipulating the elements of a set. I see nothing wrong with this sort of conception, at least for
subsets of ω, but it is not essential for what follows. The important point is that sets of numbers,
whatever one takes them to be, should in principle always be unequivocally recognizable as such.
This ought to be true on any reasonable conception (but probably would not be true, for example,
if one identified “set of numbers” with “intelligible property of numbers”; see §2.5).
14. Since this statement itself refers to “all sets”, one could ask whether a predicativist could
accept it without falling into contradiction, but I suppose he could have a reasonably clear idea of
what is forbidden despite being unable to formally define it. In any case, the statement is made
for the benefit of non-predicativists. A predicativist should not need to be explicitly forbidden
from talking about “all sets” since the concept would make no sense to him and it should not even
occur to him to speak this way. A similar comment could apply to the vicious-circle principle.
15. There are several predicatively equivalent versions of this condition. In intuitionistic logic with
arithmetical comprehension, the numerical omniscience schema, and A∨¬A for all atomic A, for
any a ∈ ω and any ordering on ω the statement (1) (∀X)TI(X, a) is equivalent to (2) the assertion
that {b : b ≺ a} has no proper progressive subsets and also to (3) the assertion that for all X, if
there exists b ≺ a in X then there is a least such b. Assuming dependent choice for arithmetical
formulas, the preceding are also equivalent to (4) the assertion that every decreasing sequence in
{b : b ≺ a} is eventually constant and (5) the assertion that there is no strictly decreasing sequence
in {b : b ≺ a}.
16. According to reference [12] it is the ∆0 collection schema which makes the KP axioms impred-
icative. Footnote 7 of [12] refers to [29] for justification of this point, but the relevant comment
in footnote 4 of [29] explicitly locates impredicativity in the fact that “the interpretation of the
logical constants, in particular of →, is classical”. This seems to imply that if intuitionistic logic
were used then the KP axioms would be predicatively valid, so that weakening the logical ax-
ioms from classical to intuitionistic would render acceptable non-logical axioms which allow one
to access ordinals beyond Γ0. Apparently this possibility was never pursued.
17. In an earlier version of this paper I suggested that T could alternatively be interpreted as
meaning “provable in S augmented by an infinitary ω-rule”. However, this is not helpful because
it is ambiguous about exactly which proof trees would be covered. If we allow all proof trees that
are well-founded in the sense of admitting induction, then the predicativist should have the same
difficulty accepting the Tarskian implication T (pAq) → A as he has in accepting the condition
(∗) discussed in Section 1.4; the Tarskian hierarchies would then be impredicative in the same
way as Feferman’s autonomous systems. To avoid this difficulty we would have to insist on using
proof trees that are well-founded in a strong enough sense to admit an inductive proof that any
theorem proven along such a tree is actually true. But this requires explicitly using the concept
of truth, which is what the alternative interpretation of T was meant to avoid.
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